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I. INTRODUCTION
Texas legislators in Austin are trying to pass a bill which will siphon 527
million dollars from the budgets of public school districts in six of the
state's largest counties.' The siphoned funds will not be used by state
officials to improve existing public schools, but instead will be redis-
tributed in the form of vouchers to approximately 143,000 students so
that they may attend private schools.2 Supporters of the legislation claim
that such a program will improve the quality of education all Texas stu-
dents receive. Yet, for Edgewood Independent School District Superin-
tendent, Dolores Mufioz, vouchers represent a nightmare? In the first
three months of 1999 alone, her school district has lost more than 500
1. See TEx. S.B. 10, 76th Leg., R.S. (1999) (relating to the creation of a voucher pro-
gram for certain educationally disadvantaged children attending certain school districts);
Melissa Prentice, Voucher Bill Targets Six Largest Counties, SAN ANTONIO EXPRmss-Nnws,
Mar. 5, 1999, at IA (discussing State Senator Teel Bivins' newest voucher proposal).
2. See Prentice, supra note I (estimating that 143,000 students within the six counties
would qualify for state funded vouchers and in Bexar county alone, more than 31,000 stu-
dents would be eligible); Anastasia Cisneros-Lunsford and Jeanne Russell, School Voucher
Bill Applauded, SAN AmNo io EXP.REss-Nws, Mar. 6,1999, at B1 (reporting that voucher
advocates applauded the unveiling of a bill that would use state funds to send poor chil-
dren to private schools).
3. See Kathy Walt, Voucher Foes Take Case to Austin, Edgewood Schools Chief Tells
Lawmakers Real Cost of Pilot Project, Hous. CHRON., Feb. 4,1999, at 32 (quoting Muiloz'
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students to a private voucher program4 and it is estimated they will lose
three million dollars in state funding in the next year.- Three million dol-
lars Mufioz knows could have been used to hire new teachers or purchase
textbooks and computers.6 Three million dollars a poor school district
like Edgewood will never recoup. After years of leading the fight for
equality in educational funding, it is ironic that Edgewood finds itself
having to prepare for battle once again.7 Edgewood understands the im-
portance of equal education more than any other school district in the
state; they also know that diverting educational funds away from public
schools will not improve the quality of the children's education.s
This Comment focuses on the effect a voucher system will have on the
ability of school districts, such as Edgewood, to provide those students
who remain in public schools with a quality education. The Texas
Supreme Court, in Edgewood v. Kirby,9 held that children have the right
of equal access to educational funds and equal access to educational op-
portunities despite where they live.10 This Comment argues that a
voucher system violates Article VII, Section 1 of the Texas Constitution"
because it fails to provide for a financially efficient system of educational
funding and fails to provide for the general diffusion of knowledge. Part
II will provide a brief historical outline of how disparities in educational
4. See Kathy Walt & Thaddeus Herrick, Voucher Programs' Future Debated After
Court Ruling, Hous. CHno., Nov. 10, 1998, at 1 (discussing the existing voucher program
offered by the private organization known as Children's Educational Opportunity Founda-
tion). The Children's Educational Opportunity Foundation is the first organization in the
state to target a complete school district, like Edgewood, with private vouchers. See id.
5. See Prentice, supra note 1 (noting the impact a private voucher program has had on
the Edgewood School District).
6. See Walt, supra note 3 (reporting that in 1999 Edgewood lost four million dollars in
state funds which Dr. Mufioz stated could have gone to teacher training, technology, class-
room materials, buildings and other projects).
7. In 1968, Demetrio Rodriguez, the parent of school children enrolled in Edgewood
Independent School District, challenged the constitutionality of the Texas system of fund-
ing education. See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 4 (1973).
8. See Terrence Stutz, Edgewood Parents Protest School Vouchers in Austin, District
Describes Limited Program and Its Setbacks, DALLAS Morn a No-s, Feb. 4, 1999, at
25A (citing comments made by an Edgewood parent on her opposition to distribution of
state vouchers); Walt, supra note 3 (reporting on the views held by Edgewood parents on
the negative effect vouchers have had on their district).
9. See Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391, 397 (Tex. 1989)
[Edgewood 1] (holding that the Texas system of funding education was unconstitutional
because it failed to meet the "efficiency" standard set forth in Article VII, Section 1 of the
Texas Constitution).
10. See id. (defining an efficient system of funding education as one that provides all
students with equal access to education funds).
11. See Tux. CONST. art. VII, § 1 (calling on the Legislature to provide for an efficient
system of public free schools).
19991
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funding between school districts developed. It discusses the United
States Supreme Court's landmark decision in San Antonio Independent
School District v. Rodriguez,'2 which set the stage for future litigation at
the state level on the issue of equity in educational funding. Part II will
also examine the Texas Supreme Court's holding in Edgewood I;11 that
the State's system of funding primary and secondary education was un-
constitutional. 4 It evaluates the Court's interpretation of Article VII,
Section I of the Texas Constitution' and will discuss the affirmative duty
it imposes on the state legislature to establish an efficient system of public
free schools. 6 Lastly, Part II analyzes the "efficiency" standard set forth
by the Texas Supreme Court.
Part III of this Comment will examine the voucher systems proposed
by various members of the Texas Legislature. 7 It discusses the criteria
needed to qualify for participation in a voucher program, the proposed
costs, the issue of funding, and the alleged safeguards imposed in an ef-
fort to prevent private institutions from discriminating against potential
students. Part IV will analyze arguments for and against vouchers and
attempts to weigh the proposed benefits of vouchers against the probable
creation of a two-tiered educational system. It will also evaluate legal
arguments against the constitutionality of vouchers used in Milwaukee,
Wisconsin and Cleveland, Ohio.
Part V will examine what the framers of Article VII, Section 1 intended
to provide concerning a constitutional education system. It will also dis-
cuss the disparities vouchers are expected to create. It will reevaluate the
Texas Supreme Court's interpretation of Article VII, Section 1 and deter-
12. See Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 29, 35 (rejecting plaintiff's argument that wealth in the
area of education is a suspect class and education a fundamental right).
13. See Edgewood 1, 777 S.W.2d at 397 (finding that the State's method of funding
primary and secondary education failed to create an efficient system of public free
schools).
14. See id. at 397 (concluding that the Texas system of funding education was neither
financially efficient nor efficient in the diffusion of knowledge).
15. See id. at 394, 396 (acknowledging the framer's intent to create an "efficient" sys-
tem of funding education that would provide for the general diffusion of knowledge).
16. See id. at 398 (declaring that the Texas Constitution imposes upon the legislature a
duty to support public education).
17. See Tex S.B. 10, 76th Leg., R.S. (1999) (calling for the creation of a voucher pro-
gram for educationally disadvantaged children); Tex H.B. 920, 74th Leg., R.S. (1995) (call-
ing for the creations of a public education scholarship program); Tex S.B. 92,74th Leg., R.S
(1995) (permitting state funds in the form of vouchers to be use by qualifying parents as a
means of subsidizing the cost of sending their child to a private school); Tex. H.B 2395;
75th Leg., R.S. (1997) (establishing state scholarships as a way of funding primary and
secondary education at a "free school"); Tex. H.B. 1315, 74th Leg., R.S. (1995) (providing
vouchers for at-risk students attending public school to use state funds as a means of subsi-
dizing the cost of attendance at a private school).
[Vol. 1:323
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mine whether a proposed voucher system will pass constitutional muster.
Part VI concludes that a voucher system, if implemented, would violate
Article VII, Section 1 of the Texas Constitution. It will fail because a
voucher system does not meet the efficiency standards set forth by the
Texas Supreme Court in Edgewood L This Comment will show that a
voucher system not only fails to be financially efficient, but also fails to
efficiently provide for the general diffusion of knowledge. Minority chil-
dren or children living in low property value school districts are thus not
provided equal access to educational funds or opportunities.
II. THE TEXAS LEGISLATURE'S CoNsTrru-nONAL DUTY TO PROVIDE
FOR AN EFFICIENT SYSTEM OF EDUCATION
A. Why Disparities in Access to Educational Funds Among School
Districts Developed and the Legal Challenges That Followed
The importance of education for the survival of a democratic society
was recognized early by the forefathers of Texas. We can trace an educa-
tion provision calling for the establishment of public free schools to the
Texas Constitution as early as 1836.18 The provision would be amended
several times before 1876, when the State's current education provision,
Article VII, Section 1 was adopted.' 9 Article VII, Section 1 of the Texas
Constitution reads:
A general diffusion of knowledge being essential to the preservation
of the liberties and rights of the people, it shall be the duty of the
Legislature of the State to establish and make suitable provision for
the support and maintenance of an efficient system of public free
schools.20
With a constitutional provision in place, the legislature was faced with
the challenge of creating a system of funding which would support and
maintain an efficient system of public free schools. In 1883, the legisla-
ture answered the challenge by creating local school districts and empow-
ering them with the authority to levy and collect taxes for purpose of
18. See Tnx. CONST. art. VII, § 1 interp. commentary (Vernon 1993) (commenting on
the history of Article VII, Section 1 as was adopted and amended in Texas Constitutions of
1836, 1845, 1869, and 1876). See generally 2 GEORGE D. BRADEN, THm CoNsrrrTumoN oF
TE STATE OF TExAs: AN ANNOTATED AND Co PAR.Arrv ANALYsIs 505-07 (1977) (dis-
cussing how Article VII, Section I evolved from 1836 through 1876).
19. See BRADEN, supra note 18, at 506 (noting that the transition from a private sys-
tem of education to the present public school system required by Article VIL Section 1
began in the mid 1880's).
20. TEx. CoNsr. art. VII, § 1.
1999]
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funding education.21 Reliance on local taxes, coupled with revenue from
the State, formed a dual system of funding with the State and local com-
munities each sharing in the cost of educating Texas school children.22
The system, however, proved to be flawed. Because school districts' local
revenue was dependent upon the value of property, disparities in funding
among districts became more pronounced as rural and urban areas devel-
oped at different rates.2 School districts rich in property value could
generate more local revenue by taxing at a lower rate than a low-property
value school district taxing at a higher rate.24 The disparities in funding
eventually led to disparities in the educational opportunities afforded to
school children.2 Students living in wealthier districts were exposed to a
broader educational experience.26 Wealthier districts could afford to of-
21. See TE.X. CONST. art. VII, § 3 (1876, as amended 1883) (granting the State legisla-
ture authority to provide for the formation of a school district by general law). Article VII,
Section 3 also grants the legislature with the ability to authorize school districts to levy an
ad valorem tax for the maintenance of public free schools. See id.; see also BRADEN, supra
note 18, at 512-13 (commenting on changes made to Article VII, Section 3 by amendment
in 1926); Henry Cuellar, Considerations in Drafting a Constitutional School Finance Plan:
A Legislator's Prospective 19 T. MARSHALL L. REV. 83, 87 (1993) (providing the historical
chronology of the Texas school finance system).
22. See Bernard Lau, Note, Edgewood Independent School District v. Kirby: A Polit-
ical Question? 43 BAYLOR L. Rav. 187, 188 (1991) (explaining that the state and local
school districts share the cost of financing school operations); Robert L. Manteuffel, Com-
ment, The Quest for Efficiency: Public School Funding in Texas, 43 Sw. LJ. 1119, 1124
(1990) (detailing the financial contributions made by the state and local districts in the
financing of education).
23. See Carrollton-Farmers Branch v. Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist., 826 S.W.2d 489,
495 (Tex. 1992) [Edgewood II1] (analyzing the disparities in local revenue between school
districts which became apparent as early as 1915); Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby,
777 S.W.2d 391, 396 (Tex. 1989) [Edgewood n (stating that efficiency probably could have
been maintained had the state's population grown at the same rate in each district); Cuel-
lar, supra note 21, at 87 (indicating that greater disparities in local tax wealth developed
despite the state's attempt to equalize aid to rural school districts).
24. See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 12-13 (1973) (recog-
nizing the disparities among school districts in the amount of revenue generated by local
property taxes); see also Edgewood 1, 777 S.W.2d at 393 (noting that property wealth sig-
nificantly impacts the amount of revenue a district is able to generate and spend on educa-
tional purposes); Lau, supra note 22, at 189 (discussing the ability of wealthier districts to
generate revenue at a lower tax rate).
25. See Edgewood I, 777 S.W.2d at 393 (reviewing the district court's finding, that
property-poor districts although taxing at a higher rate, still had inferior educational pro-
grams); Lau, supra note 22, at 189 (noting that disparities in property wealth resulted in
disparities in the education services provided to students).
26. See Edgewood 1, 777 S.W.2d at 393 (expanding on how wealthier districts are able
to provide more extensive curricula, up-to-date technology, libraries and more experienced
teachers); see generally JosE CARDENAS, TEXAs SCHOOL FNANcE REFoRM, AN IDRA
PERsPEcrTvE 15, 16 (1997) (illustrating the conditions present in the Edgewood Independ-
ent School District which lead to the suit challenging the constitutionality of the Texas
(Vol. 1:323
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fer a better curriculum, enrichment programs, more qualified teachers,
modem facilities, and advanced technology.'
Parents and educators of children attending schools located in low-
property value districts argued that these disparities violated their 14"'
Amendment right to equal protection.' In the summer of 1968, Mexi-
can-American parents of school children who were enrolled in the
Edgewood Independent School District decided to challenge the consti-
tutionality of Texas' system of funding.2 9 They filed suit in federal court
arguing that wealth in the area of education constituted a suspect class
and that education itself was a fundamental right.3"
The plaintiffs argued that the State's dual system of funding education
discriminated on the basis of wealth.31 A school district located in an
area with a low tax value was destined, by its very nature, to have less
access to educational funds than a district whose tax base consisted of
property rich in value.32 Districts which were inadequately funded, there-
fore, denied school children attending poor districts equal protection.
This lack of funding prevented students from enjoying the same educa-
system of funding education); Lau, supra note 22, at 189 (examining how the ability to
generate greater revenue afforded wealthier districts with the opportunity to provide bet-
ter facilities, curricula, and better trained teachers).
27. See Edgewood 1, 777 S.W.2d at 393.
28. Parents argued that education was a fundamental right and the inability of a poor
district to offer the same educational opportunities to its students as those found in a
wealthier district was a violation of equal protection. See Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 29 (focus-
ing on the plaintiff's assertion that the State's system of funding education interferes with
the exercise of a fundamental right).
29. See Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 4-5 (indicating that the suit was an attack on the Texas
system of funding education initiated by Mexican-American parents whose children were
enrolled in the Edgewood Independent School District); see also Joe Ball, Comment, Effi-
cient and Suitable Provision For the Texas Public School Finance System: An Impossible
Dream?, 46 SMU L. Rv. 763,766 (1992) (examining why Demetrio Rodriguez filed suit in
federal district court in 1968); Manteuffel, supra note 22, at 1120 (1990) (discussing the
legal challenge initiated by parents of students in the Edgewood district).
30. See Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 11, 28-29 (addressing the holding of the District Court
as well as the claims made by the plaintiff's that wealth in the area of education is a suspect
class and education a fundamental right).
31. See id. at 19 (restating the plaintiff's contention that the Texas system of school
financing discriminates against the poor and indigent).
32. See id. at 25 (reviewing the plaintiff's claim that a correlation exist between the
wealth of families in a district and the amount of money available to support education
expenditures); Ball, supra note 29, at 766 (emphasizing the plaintiff's claim that a district's
property value affected the amount of funds available for educational expenditures and
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tional opportunities afforded children in wealthier districts.33 The plain-
tiffs argued that the State could not permit such inequities unless they
could provide a compelling interest.' The district court found in favor of
the plaintiffs, but the victory was short lived as the U.S. Court of Appeals
overturned the verdict.35
In 1973, the United States Supreme Court issued a decision in favor of
the State of Texas.36 In the landmark holding, the Court rejected the
plaintiffs' arguments that wealth was a suspect class and education a fun-
damental right.37 The Supreme Court held that education, although vital
to society, is not a right implied or expressly granted in the U.S. Constitu-
tion. The State, therefore, need only show a rational relationship be-
tween the existing funding system and a legitimate state interest.3 8 In San
Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez,39 the Court found that
the State of Texas established a legitimate purpose for upholding the ex-
isting system; that the dual system of funding provided local governments
with a measure of participation and control over the education of their
children.4"
B. The Significance of the U.S. Supreme Court's Ruling in Rodriguez
The Supreme Court's decision in Rodriguez proved to be significant in
the fight for equality in educational funding because it limited the judicial
33. See Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 19 (analyzing the District Court's support for the plain-
tiff's position that the Texas system of funding education discriminates on the basis of
wealth and in turn results in disparities in the quality of education received by poor chil-
dren as compared to rich children).
34. See id. at 17, 29 (acknowledging that it must determine whether or not wealth in
the area of education constitutes a suspect class thus requiring the application of strict
scrutiny).
35. See iL at 17-19 (discussing the District Court's ruling that wealth in the area of
education constitutes a suspect class).
36. See id. at 6 (stating that the Court reversed the decision reached by the District
Court).
37. See id. at 28-29, 37 (finding that the Texas system of funding education does not
discriminate against a suspect class nor does it infringe upon a fundamental right).
38. See id. at 35 (emphasizing that education is not among the right explicitly pro-
tected under the U.S. Constitution, nor is it one that they find a basis to extend implied
protection); Ball, supra note 29, at 766 (interpreting the Supreme Court's finding that edu-
cation is not a fundamental right).
39. See Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 59 (refusing to invalidate the State's method of funding
education).
40. See id. at 48-49 (reiterating the fact that Texas must only show a reasonable basis
for imposing a system which results in disparities in per pupil expenditure and based upon
the evidence their burden was met); Manteuffel, supra note 22, at 1120 (reviewing the
Supreme Court's holding that the state of Texas had established that its system of funding
education furthered a legitimate state purpose).
[Vol. 1:323
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arena in which a state system of funding could be challenged." The Rod-
riguez Court made it clear that individual states should resolve education
issues.42 Disparities caused by the reliance on locally raised revenue
would fail if brought before a federal court, because relief is not available
under the Equal Protection Clause of the U.S. Constitution.4" The
Supreme Court, in essence, held that federal challenges to a state's sys-
tem of funding education will only be successful if a state is unable to
establish a rational basis for the system's imposition." Nevertheless,
state funding practices can still be successfully challenged based on state
law principles. Particularly since a judgment issued by the highest court
of a state regarding state law is in effect controlling, and not easily subject
to review by the United States Supreme Court.4s
C. The Battle for Equality in Educational Funding Shifts to the States
Discouraged but not dissuaded by the U.S. Supreme Court's decision
in Rodriguez, Edgewood school superintendent, Dr. Jose Cardenas
viewed the Court's ruling as a challenge.46 Frmly believing that the State
Constitution provided broader protection for educational rights, a class
action suit, Edgewood v. Kirby, was filed in the 2 50 h State District Court
in Texas.47 The lawsuit alleged that reliance on local tax revenue to fund
education created disparities between districts rich in property value and
41. See Ball, supra note 29, at 766 (stating that the Supreme Court's decision in Rodri-
guez limited future litigation to state courts); Lau, supra note 22, at 194 (interpreting the
Supreme Court's decision in Rodriguez to indicate that challenges to a state's system of
funding education must be based on state grounds rather than 14th Amendment equal
protection claims); Manteuffel, supra note 22 at 1121 (noting that the Supreme Court's
decision in Rodriguez left poor school districts with no alternative but to initiate challenges
in state courts).
42. See Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 40-44 (explaining that issues of education and funding
are too complex for the Court to address and are best left for each state to resolve).
43. See id. at 40-41 (stating that Equal Protection precedence requires that the Court
refrain from intruding in an area traditionally deferred to state legislatures and in such
cases, a state need only show a rational relationship to a state purpose).
44. See id. (echoing the reluctance of past Court's from interfering in issues involving
questions of federalism and the ability of states to govern free from strict judicial scrutiny).
45. See id. at 58-59 (acknowledging that while plaintiff's concerns warrant attention,
the resolution must come from the legislature and its constituency).
46. See CARuENrAs, supra note 26, at 218 (discussing the lead role IDRA took in initi-
ating Edgewood litigation). IDRA, together with attorneys from the Me,,dcan American
Legal Defense and Educational Fund, crafted the arguments used to challenge the Texas
system of funding. See Id.
47. See Id. at 91-150 (discussing the factors leading to IDRA and the school district's
initiation of Edgewood v. Kirby).
19991
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districts with low property value.48 Disparities in funding, in turn, im-
pacted the educational opportunities afforded students living in poor dis-
tricts, and therefore deprived them of their right to equal protection
under the Constitution.49 The District Court agreed with the plaintiffs
and concluded that the disparities created by the State's system of fund-
ing violated the plaintiffs' right to equal protection under the State Con-
stitution, and failed to ensure that all school districts had equal ability to
obtain funds.50 The District Court agreed with the plaintiffs and held that
education under the Texas Constitution was a fundamental right and
wealth in the context of education funding constituted a suspect class.51
The State appealed and the Court of Appeals reversed the lower court's
findings.5 2 In 1989, the Texas Supreme Court granted certeriori and re-
versed the Court of Appeals. 3
The Texas Supreme Court affirmed the District Court's finding that the
State's method of funding public education violated Article VII, Section 1
of the Texas Constitution,54 but declined to rule on the issue of Equal
Protection.55 The court interpreted Article VII, Section 1 as imposing an
affirmative duty on the legislature to establish an efficient system of pub-
lic free schools essential for the general diffusion of knowledge.5 In
48. See Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391, 392 (Tex. 1992)
[Edgewood 1] (recognizing the glaring disparities in the abilities of various districts to gen-
erate revenue from property taxes).
49. See id. at 392, 393 (analyzing the effect disparities in funding have on the quality of
education a student receives)
50. See Albert H. Kauffman & Carmen Maria Rumbaut, Applying Edgewood v. Kirby
to Analysis of Fundamental Rights Under the Texas Constitution, 22 ST. MARe's L.J. 69, 73
(1990) (citing District Judge Harley Clark's finding of fact that the Texas school finance
system fails to insure that each school district has equal opportunity to educational funds).
51. See Edgewood I, 777 S.W.2d at 393 (referring to the trial court's conclusion that
the school financing system violates both the equal protection clause of the Texas Constitu-
tion and the efficiency clause of the education amendment).
52. See Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby, 761 S.W.2d 859 (Tex. App.-Austin
1988), rev'd, 777 S.W.2d 391 (Tex. 1989).
53. See Edgewood I, 777 S.W.2d at 397 (declaring that the Texas Supreme Court re-
versed the judgement of the court of appeals and with modification, affirmed the decision
of the trial court).
54. See TEx. CoNsT. art. VII, § 1 (mandating the creation of an efficient system of
public free schools).
55. See Edgewood I, 777 S.W.2d at 391, 392, 398 (proclaiming that upon finding the
state's finance system violated the efficiency clause there was no need to consider petition-
ers' other constitutional claims).
56. See iL at 394-98 (interpreting Article VII, Section 1 as mandating the establish-
ment of an "efficient" system of education); see also Ball, supra note 29, at 768 (articulating
the fact that Article VII, Section I mandates an efficient system of financing); Kauffman &
Rumbaut, supra note 50, at 73 (discussing the Texas Supreme Court's interpretation of
Article VII, Section 1).
[Vol. 1:323
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reaching its decision, the court examined the intent of the article's cre-
ators and determined that "efficient" was not intended to mean cheap or
inexpensive.' The court found that the framers intended the legislature
to establish a system of public free schools that would provide all children
a common education. 8 The term "efficient" was intended by the framers
to mean productive and non-wasteful.5 9 An efficient system would be one
that was financially efficient as well as efficient in the general diffusion of
knowledge.6 0 The court went on to define "financially efficient" as a sys-
tem that produced results using all available resources with little waste.'
A financially efficient system must also afford equal access to educational
funds for all children.6' In other words, a school district would have ac-
cess to funds in relation to its tax effort 63 An efficient system would not
permit a school district located in a low-property value area to tax high
but spend low.' The Texas Supreme Court also said that an efficient sys-
tem would provide for the 'general diffusion of knowledge.'" School
children in low-property value school districts should have equal access to
a similar educational experience as those children in property rich dis-
tricts.66 Applying these standards to the existing disparities, the Texas
Supreme Court found that the State's system of financing primary and
secondary education was both financially inefficient and inefficient in
providing for the general diffusion of knowledge.0 The court stated that
"efficiency" was not equivalent to a per capita distribution of funds, but
instead required the legislature to provide all children, regardless of
57. See Edgewood 1, 777 S.W.2d at 394 (asserting that the Texas Constitution derives
from the people of Texas and when construing the language of its provisions, the intent of
its framers must be considered).
58. See id. at 395 (referring to statements made by the chair of the education commit-
ted at the 1875 Constitutional convention asserting that a common education should be
placed within the reach of every child in the State).
59. See id. at 395-96 (defining "efficient" in terms of finance and opportunity).
60. See id at 396 (concluding that to the constitutional framers "efficiency" meant a
system that would provide for the "general diffusion of knowledge").
61. See id. at 395 (construing "efficient" to mean effective or productive with little
waste).
62. See id. at 397 (defining an efficient system as one that affords substantially equal
access to educational funds).
63. See Edgewood I, 777 S.W.2d at 397 (defining what the Court means when refer-
ring to financially efficient).
64. See id. at 396 (arguing that an efficient school system would not allow for the
"concentration of resources in property rich school districts").
65. See id at 397 (concluding that the framer's clearly desired a system that would
provide for a "general diffusion of knowledge").
66. See id. (recognizing that the education code requires that each student has "access
to programs and services that are substantially equal to those available" in other districts).
67. See id. at 397 (holding that the state's school financing system is a violation of
Article VII, Section 1 of the Texas Constitution).
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where they live, with an equal access to funds and an equal access to
educational experiences."8 The court mandated the legislature to take
immediate action to produce a constitutional method of financing public
education.
69
In 1991, and again in 1992, the Texas Supreme Court would declare the
State's attempt at establishing an "efficient" method of financing educa-
tion unconstitutional.70 It was not until 1995 that the court finally ap-
proved the State's third attempt at a constitutional system of financing
education. 7 In Edgewood v. Meno,72 often referred to as "Edgewood
IV," the Texas Supreme Court held that a constitutional system did not
have to provide for equality in funding at all levels.7 3 The court held that
an efficient system is one that provides equal access to funds sufficient for
the general diffusion of knowledge.74 A school district's ability to gener-
ate local revenue to supplement their programs is not enough to render a
system inefficient; even if the funds are not subject to recapture or are
unmatched by state dollars. 5 Lastly, the court refused the request of an-
other group of appellants who as plaintiff-intervenors alleged a constitu-
68. See id. at 397 (emphasizing that while efficiency is not equated with per capita
distribution, it also does not allow resources to be concentrated in small pockets of districts
rich in property value).
69. See Edgewood 1, 777 S.W.2d at 399 (deciding that a remedy was long overdue, and
the legislature was instructed to take immediate action).
70. See Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby, 804 S.W.2d 491, 500 (Tex. 1991)
[Edgewood II] (holding that Senate Bill 1, the State's first attempt to produce a constitu-
tional system of funding, was unsuccessful). The Court found Senate Bill I was inefficient
because although it guaranteed per student revenue, on whole, it failed to remedy the
inequity of relying on local property taxes for a major portion of educational funds. See
id.; see also Carrolton-Farmers Branch Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist.,
826 S.W.2d 489, 524 (Tex. 1992) [Edgewood III] (holding that the Legislature is prohibited
by Article VII, Section 3 of the Texas Constitution from mandating the amount of local
revenue a school district will contribute to the funding of education). Senate Bill 351
called for the establishment of County Education Districts whose sole responsibility was to
levy taxes, collect the revenue and distribute it equally among the school districts within its
boundaries. See id. at 510.
71. See Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Meno, 917 S.W.2d 717, 730-31 (Tex. 1994)
[Edgewood IV (holding that the state had taken appropriate steps to insure that all stu-
dents would have equal access to funds sufficient to provide for the general diffusion of
knowledge).
72. 917 S.W.2d 717 (Tex. 1994) [Edgewood IV].
73. Revenue generated to supplement or enrich a district's.existing program is not
subject to equalization. See id. at 729. All that is required of the state is to insure that all
districts have access to the funds needed to meet state accreditation. See id. at 729.
74. See id. at 729 (focusing on the qualitative component of Article VII, Section 1,
which is the requirement for a system which provides for the general diffusion of
knowledge).
75. See id. at 732 (commenting on why it ruled to uphold Senate Bill 7).
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tional right to choose the school their child would attend.76 The plaintiffs
sought reimbursement from the state for the cost of private school tui-
tion.7 They argued that the state had failed in its constitutional duty to
create an efficient system of public free schools and asked the court to
provide judicial remedy in the form of a voucher.78 The court rejected
the plaintiffs' argument and instead found that mandating a voucher pro-
gram was outside of its authority.7 9 The court stated that its role was to
determine if the State had met its constitutional duty, and not to tell the
legislature how to do its job. 0
III. How VOuCHEIRs ARE IMPLEMMNTED WI.LL D=TRRimzE
WHET-ER TnEY ARE A BErRAYAL OF TRUST OR THE
DOOR TO GREATER EDUCATIONAL
OPPORTUNITIES FOR STUDENTS
OF Low-INcOME
Jennifer Ramirez can hear the anxiety in her children's voices as they
prepare for school. Although she received a GED, it is her dream that
her children will graduate from high school and continue on to college.
As they head for school, however, she worries about the quality of educa-
tion they receive from the public school they attend. As a single mother,
Ms. Ramirez struggles to make ends meet. The school district responsible
for educating her children is one of the poorest in the state. Unlike the
schools located in wealthier areas of the city, the schools her children
attend lack such common technology as computers. In addition, because
of the inability of the district to pay higher salaries, many teachers in-
structing her children are young and lack the experience needed to pro-
vide a solid foundation. The curriculum, although vastly improved, still
remains inferior to wealthier districts, and the children continue to fail
state exams in larger proportion. Although Ms. Ramirez's income quali-
fied her to participate in a private voucher program, she still found that
she could not afford to make the change. While the voucher subsidized a
private school's tuition, Ms. Ramirez was responsible for the remaining
76. See id. at 747 (rejecting a request made by plaintiff- intervenors that the Court
require reimbursement for the cost of sending their children to a private school).
77. See idL at 747 (considering the assertion that the right to select the school a child
attends is a constitutional right).
78. See Edgewood IV, 917 S.W.2d at 747 (examining the request made by plaintiff-
intervenors for immediate remedy by ordering school districts to contract with private
schools).
79. See id. at 747-48 (reiterating that the Court's authority only extended to the ability
to determine if the legislature's constitutional duty had been met).
80. See id. at 748 (stating that it is not the Court's responsibility to develop an efficient
system of public schools, that duty belongs to the legislature).
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cost such as uniforms, books, computer fees, and other miscellaneous ex-
penses. The cost of transportation also played a factor because all of the
private schools in her district were filled to capacity and the only institu-
tion which would accept her children was at least forty minutes away
from her home.
As the result of circumstance beyond her control, Ms. Ramirez was
forced to keep her children in a public school district that now had even
fewer funds available to spend on education. In her eyes, vouchers do
not improve the ability of her school district to offer a higher quality of
education to her children. 81
Parents such as those depicted by Ms. Ramirez are not alone in their
concerns about the quality of education offered by Texas public schools.
In an effort to address the disparities present in the existing system, mem-
bers of the Texas Legislature are considering the implementation of a
statewide pilot voucher program. 2 Similar to the vouchers currently dis-
tributed to low-income students by a private organization,8 3 the state
vouchers would permit low-income families or students attending low
performing schools to use state funds as means to subsidize the cost of
attending private school.'" This section will briefly discuss the historical
81. This hypothetical is a compilation of stories told by parents whose children remain
in public schools that lose state money as a result of vouchers. Although the characters are
fictional, the concerns are real problems that must be addressed by the legislature.
82. See R.A. Dyer, Voucher Measure Submitted Bill Targets Needy Students Who Fail
Test, FORT WORTH STAR-TEILEGRAM, Jan. 19, 1999, at I (discussing the most recent legisla-
tive proposal for a pilot voucher program); Jimmy Mansour, School Vouchers with Legisla-
ture Considering a Pilot Program, Debate Heats Up, DALLAs MoRNINo NEws, Jan. 17,
1999, at 1J (noting that the 76th State Legislature will consider the implementation of a
pilot voucher program).
83. Currently low-income children attending school within the Edgewood district
qualify for a voucher intended to subsidize the cost of tuition at a private school. See Allen
Parker, CEO Program Makes Everyone a Winner, SAN ANTONIo Expasss-Nnws, Sept. 29,
1998 at 5B (highlighting the criteria needed to qualify for vouchers through CEO pro-
gram). The voucher system is a program offered by the non-profit organization Children's
Educational Opportunity Foundation (CEO). See id. The foundation has stated that the
program will provide $50 million dollars over a ten year period to children whose family
income falls below the poverty level. See generally, Kelley Shannon, School Vouchers for
Children in Poor District Stir Uproar, BuFALo NEWS, Apr. 23, 1998, at Al (noting that
CEO has said it will provide five million dollars annually for ten years for student in
Edgewood ISD to attend a school of their choice); $50 Million for School Vouchers Going
to Low-Income Texas District Nearly All of 14,000 Students Eligible for Foundation's Lar-
gess, Cm. TRm., Apr. 23, 1998, available in 1998 WL 2848836 (detailing CEO voucher
program).
84. See Tex. H.B. 709,76th Leg., R.S. (1999) (calling for the implementation of a pub-
lic scholarship program for certain children); Tex. S.B. 1206,75th Leg., R.S. (1997) (calling
for a scholarship pilot program for children from low-performing public schools); Tex. H.B.
2395, 75th Leg., R.S. (1997) (calling for a scholarship pilot program accepting economically
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development of vouchers and will examine several legislative proposals
for a pilot program offered by members of the Texas Legislature.
A. The History of Vouchers
While the implementation of a voucher system is relatively new to the
education scene, we can trace the concept itself back more than two hun-
dred years to Thomas Paine." The individual, however, who many con-
sider the father of the modem concept of vouchers, is economist Milton
Friedman. 6 Friedman believed education should be viewed as a product,
and parents as consumers. Public school districts along with private insti-
tutions would make up the marketplace.' Permitting parents the right to
choose the school their child attends would create the economic theory of
supply and demand." Schools offering the highest quality of education
would be the most in demand, and other schools would be forced to im-
disadvantaged children); Tex. S.B. 92, 74th Leg., R.S. (1995) (enacting an education
voucher program); Tex. H.B. 1315, 74th Leg., R.S. (1995) (providing vouchers for at-risk
students attending public school or expelled from a public school); HoUsE REsEARtH OR-
GANIZArON, CHAPTER ScHooLs, VoUcHas AND OTHE SCHOOL CHOICE O'nos 7
[hereinafter House RESEARCH ORGANIZATION] (discussing H.B. 920, 73d Leg. RS. (1993)
which established a pilot voucher program in Texas).
85. See Philip T.K. Daniel, A Comprehensive Analysis of Educational Choice: Can the
Polemic of Problems Be Overcome?, 43 DEPAuL L REV. 1, 3 (1993) (describing Thomas
Paine's theory of a deregulated education system); Eric Nasstrom, Casenote, School
Vouchers in Minnesota. Confronting the Walls of Separating Church and State, 22 Wi.
MrrcrE.L L. R-v. 1065, 1070 (1996) (stating Paine's vision for a voucher program).
86. See Cheryl D. Block, Truth and Probability- Ironies in tie Evolution of Social
Choice Theory, 76 WASH. U.LQ. 975, 1027 (1998) (recognizing that the concept of vouch-
ers can be attributed to Milton Friedman); Michael J. Stick, Educational Vouders: A Con-
stitutional Analysis, 28 CoLUm. J.L. & Soc. PRons. 423, 427-28 (1995) (explaining the role
vouchers play in the marketplace theory as proposed by economist Milton Friedman).
87. See MILTON F Im AN, CAPIsIM AND FaEOEno 85-108 (1962) (explaining
Friedman's market-place theory); Jack Alan Kramer, Note, Vouching for Federal Educa-
tional Choice: If You Pay Them, They Will Come, 29 VAL_ U.L. Rv 1005, 1016-17 (1995)
(outlining Friedman's marketplace theory as it applies to education).
88. See Jim Hilton, Note, Local Autonomy, Educational Equity, and Czoice" A Criti-
cism of a Proposal to Reform America's Educational System, 72 B.U. L REv. 973, 974
(1992) (examining Friedman's market place theory of demand and competition); See
Kramer, supra note 87, at 1016 (explaining that choice and competition forces schools to
become more receptive to the demands of parents).
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prove in order to stay competitive.8 9 If a school proved unworthy, and
could not compete, it would then be forced to close.90
Friedman envisioned a voucher system funded by the state.91 Parents
would receive funds equal to the amount a state public school would have
spent to educate their child. 2 Parents could then take the voucher and
use it to send their child to the school of their choice. 3 Under Fried-
man's plan, however, private and public schools would not be limited in
the amount they could charge to educate a child.94 If the amount of the
voucher were not enough to cover all costs at a private school, the state
would require parents to supplement the remaining expense.95 The ulti-
mate belief was that competition among schools would improve the qual-
ity of the education provided. 96
B. Vouchers in Today's Society
Today, Frie.dman's marketplace theory as it applies to education re-
mains alive and well. States across the nation are considering the imple-
mentation of a voucher system as a means to improve public education
through competition.97 In Texas, the use of a voucher system was first
89. See Dominick DiRocco, Note, Making the Grade: School Choice Comes to New
Jersey, 22 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 281, 285-86 (1997) (detailing Friedman's theory of less
government control and more freedom of competition); Amity Shlaes, The Next Big Free-
Market Thing, WALL ST. J., July 9, 1998, at A18 (interviewing Milton Friedman on the
issue of vouchers and consumer needs).
90. See Kramer, supra note 87, at 1017 (noting that a school unable to attract students
would cease to exist).
91. See id.
92. See id. (detailing how Friedman envisioned a voucher system to function).
93. See Hilton, supra note 88, at 975 (explaining that vouchers under Friedman would
not cover the complete cost of tuition at a private school); George A. Clowes, The Only
Solution Is Competition (visited Feb. 2, 1999)<http'//www.heartland.org/education/dcc98/
friedman. html> (indicating that vouchers should not cover the complete cost of private
school because as a result, parents would not have a vested interest in their child's
education).
94. See Hilton, supra note 88, at 975 (noting that parents wishing to spend more than
the cost allotted to the their voucher would be required to supplement the cost).
95. See Kramer, supra note 87, at 1017 (noting that parents wishing to spend more
than their voucher could add on funds).
96. See DiRocco, supra note 89, at 287 (inferring that choice would foster competition
and ultimately improve the quality of public school education).
97. After voucher referendums failed in California, Colorado, Washington and Ore-
gon, proponents of vouchers view Texas, Florida and Pennsylvania as the best hope for
next implementation of a voucher program, currently only Milwaukee and Cleveland have
such programs. See Kim Cobb, Texas a Big Voucher Battleground/Tax Support for Private
Schools Is Backers' Goal, Hous. CHRON., Jan. 31, 1999, at 1 (providing a brief historical
prospective on the current voucher movement); Loie Fecteau, Gov. Lobbies Board on
Vouchers, ALBUQUERQUE J., Jan. 22, 1999, at I (expressing Governor Gary Johnson's sup-
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proposed by the State legislature in 1993 to equalize educational fund-
ing.98 The purpose of the legislation then was to afford low-income fami-
lies the ability to choose the type of education their child would receive. 99
The legislation referred to as H.B. 920 called for "state scholarships" to
be awarded to low-income students at sixty targeted school districts.100
Families could use the "scholarships" at any private institution willing to
accept state funds, and the amount awarded for each child would be
equivalent to 80% of the amount spent to educate the student in public
school, with the remaining 20% staying in the school district the child was
leaving. 101 The private school accepting the student would be free from
state regulations but would be required to administer the same standard-
ized testing used in public schools.1 " However, H.B. 920 never made it
out of committee and was left pending in the House Public Education
Committee after a public hearing.
10 3
C. Proposals for a Pilot Voucher Program Offered by Members of the
State Legislature
Although H.B. 920 failed to garner the support needed to push it
through committee, the idea of a voucher system has remained strong in
the minds of state legislators. Since 1993, several bills have been intro-
duced proposing the creation of such a system. 0 Regardless of the
sponsor, however, common attributes for the structure of a voucher pro-
gram can be found in all of the proposed legislation.
port for school voucher); Bobby Ross, Jr., School Vouchers Have Fans, Foes in City Parents,
DAILY OxAHoNiA, Jan. 26,1999, at 1 (noting Governor Frank Keating's voucher propo-
sal); Frank Reeves & Peter J. Shelly, Ridge Sees Little Stadium Support Some House
Republicans Do Back School Vouchers, P=rSBURGH PosT-GAzerrF, Jan. 17, 1999 at BI
(stating the position of Governor Ridge on the issue of school vouchers).
98. See House, RsEAncH ORGANZATON, supra note 84, at 7 (providing historical
analysis on voucher movement in Texas).




102. See id. (indicating that as a whole, private schools would be free from state
regulation).
103. See id. (noting that a bill similar to H.B. 920 also died in the state Senate).
104. See Tex. -LB. 709,76th Leg., R.S. (1999) (creating a public education scholarship
program); Tex. S.B. 1206,75th Leg., R.S. (1997) (proposing a public education scholarship
program); Tex. ILB. 2395, 75th Leg., R.S. (1997) (establishing a public education scholar-
ship pilot program); Tex. S.B. 92,74th Leg., R.S. (1995) (proposing the establishment of a
voucher program); Tex. H.B. 1315,74th Leg., RS. (1995) (regarding the implementation of
a voucher program); House RvsFaAcH ORGANIZATON, supra note 84, at 7 (discussing




Galindo: Do Minorities Really Benefit? The Untold Truth About Vouchers
Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University, 2018
THE SCHOLAR
1. Key Terminology
Supporters of a voucher system argue that the framers of Article VII,
Section 1 intended for an efficient system of "public free schools" to be
inclusive of private institutions." In light of that position, the first char-
acteristic found in a majority of the proposed bills is the use of the term
"free school" rather than private school.'" 6 Use of the term "free school"
is an attempt by sponsors to comply with the constitutional language
found in Article VII, Section 1.107 The historical analysis of the educa-
tion provision detailed in Section V of this Comment will show that, until
1869, the citizens of Texas believed the term "free school" manifested the
state's obligation to pay for the education of orphaned and indigent chil-
dren at a private school."0 '
2. Limited Participation and Distribution
The second characteristic shared by the proposed voucher schemes is
that participation in a state program will be limited.10 9 The reason for
such a limitation is an attempt to show that vouchers will be instruments
used to help those students most in need. 1 It is hoped that positive
105. See Allan E. Parker, Jr., Public Free Schools: A Constitutional Right to Educa-
tional Choice in Texas, 45 Sw. L. 825, 830-31 (1991)[hereinafter Parker, Public Free
Schools] (explaining that the constitutional history of TEx. CoNST. art. VII, Section 1
reveals that choice whether public or private school is a state Constitutional right).
106. In three of the proposed legislative bills, "free school" is defined as any non-
governmental institution providing for the primary and secondary education of students
which accepts state funds in lieu of tuition for some or all of its students. See Tex. S.B.
1206; Tex. H.B. 2395; Tex. H.B. 920.
107. See TEx. CoNsr. art. VII, § 1 (requiring the legislature to provide for an efficient
system of public free schools).
108. See Tax. CoNsT. art. VII § 1 interp. commentary (Vernon 1993) (commenting on
the use of "free school" by those who supported the use of state funds in the area of
education for the sole purpose of educating the poor and orphaned); BRADEN, supra note
18, at 505-06 (analyzing the historical context of Article VII, Section 1).
109. Four of the proposed vouchers schemes, including H.B. 709, recently introduced
by State Representative Krusee, require students to qualify for participation. See Tex.
H.B. 709 (stating that children are eligible to participate if they are educationally disadvan-
taged, are eligible to attend school under Tax. EDuc. CODE ANN. Section 25.001 (Vernon
1996), were enrolled in public school during the preceding school year, and failed to per-
form satisfactorily on the most recent state academic assessment test); Tex. S.B. 1206 (lim-
iting participation to students assigned to attend a public school at which less than 50% of
the students passed the state's academic assessment test; the child's parents attempted to
enroll the child in another school district and the chosen school district rejected the child);
Tex. H.B. 2395 (determining eligibility of student by the child's family income); Tex. S.B.
92 (making participation dependent upon a family's income); Tex. H.B. 1315 (basing par-
ticipation on student's prior disciplinary performance in public school).
110. See Telephone Interview with Byron Schlomach, Legislative Assistant, State
Representative Grusendorf (Sept. 25, 1998) (on file with The Scholar: St. Mary's Law
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benefits can be achieved, making support for a statewide program more
easily attainable."1 Legislators may also wish to restrict participation in
the belief that a court might be more willing to uphold a restrictive pilot
program even though some disparities are created." 2
Limiting the distribution of vouchers among school districts has also
been discussed as a means of restricting participation.l" Although how a
school district will be selected to participate is still uncertain, legislators
are considering districts in the major urban cities." 4 This factor is impor-
tant because most urban school districts contain a large population of
minority students."
3. Funding
The next commonality among voucher schemes appears in the area of
funding. Legislators seeking to implement a pilot program intend to ob-
Review on Minority Issues) (responding to the question, of why the majority of the pro-
posed voucher legislation limit participation based on income or academic and disciplinary
performance).
Ill. See id
112. See Gatton v. Goff, Nos. 96CVH-01-193, 96CVH-01-721,1996 WL 466499, at *17
(Ohio Corn. P1. July 31, 1996), rev'd, Nos. 96APE08-92, 96APEOS-991, 1997 WL 217583
(Ohio App. 10 Dist.) (holding that the Cleveland voucher system did not violate the uni-
formity clause found in the Ohio Constitution, because the program's status as a pilot
program was enough to negate the fact that not all students would be afforded the same
educational opportunities).
113. In such a scheme, the distribution of vouchers would be limited to only a few
school districts. See Tex. H.B. 920,74th Leg., R.S. (1995) (limiting distribution to 60 school
districts); Kim Homer, Grusendorf Plans New Bill for Tax-Supported Vouchers, DALLAS
MORNING NEWs, Feb. 18, 1999, at 1A (discussing Representative Grusendorf's most recent
voucher proposal which would limit distribution to children attending low-performing
schools located in Dallas, Houston and San Antonio); Interview with Jose Cortez, Director
of Policy Research, Intercultural Development Research Association (Nov. 1998) (on file
with The Scholar SLMary's Law Review on Minority Issues) (commenting on recent dis-
cussions he had with various members of the State Legislature during which it vas ex-
pressed that distribution of vouchers might be limited to only a few school districts).
114. See Interview with Jose Cortez, supra note 113 (stating that selected school dis-
tricts might consist of low-performing districts located in the five major urban cities).
115. See TEXAS EDUCATION AGENCY, DIvisioN OF PERFO mANCE R, oxmro OF.
pycn OF POLICY PLANNING & REsEARCH, SNAPSHOT '97, 1996-1997 School District
Profiles) (listing statistical data for Texas school districts). Snapshot figures for the 1996-97
school year showed that the Dallas Independent School District had a student population
of 154,847 with Hispanics making up 46% and African Americans 42%. See id at 116.
The San Antonio Independent School District had a student population of 61,361 with
Hispanics making up 84% and African Americans 11%. See id. at 68. El Paso Independ-
ent School District had a student population of 64,444 with Hispanics making up 76% and
Anglos 18%. See id. at 134. Houston Independent School District had a student popula-
tion of 209,375 with Hispanics making up 52% and African Americans 34%. See id. at 170.
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tain the required funding from existing state and local school budgets.
1 16
The school funds available for each child accepting a voucher would be
divided between the public district the child is leaving and the private
school she will attend. 17 The most common percentage mentioned is an
80%-20% split.1 8 This ratio represents the percentage legislators believe
is needed to achieve a balance between the amount of funds a school
district will lose and the amount of revenue still required to meet fixed
expenditures." 9 Although past proposals fail to mention whether the
split will be temporary, some legislators believe the 20% should be a tran-
sitional aid that will gradually fade.' 20
4. Admissions
Opponents of vouchers fear that private schools will be permitted to
discriminate against students who have had prior academic or disciplinary
problems. In an effort to address this fear, several legislators offering
proposals have included admission requirements in their legislation.",'
Several of the proposed bills that do not permit discrimination on the
basis of academic achievement do allow prior disciplinary action to be
considered as a factor for admission."~ Additionally, private schools are
permitted to give preference to those students already attending the
schools, to those who have siblings already attending, or to those who are
116. See Tex. S.B. 1206,75th Leg., R.S. (1997) (funding would consist of amount paid
to a school district for textbooks, transportation allotment and special allotment); Tex.
H.B. 2395, 75th Leg., R.S. (1997) (funding would consist of state funds); Tex. S.B. 92, 74th
Leg., R.S. (1995) (funding would consist of half of the basic allotment of state funds and
special funds); Tex. H.B. 1315, 74th Leg., R.S. (1995) (funding would consist of foundation
fund money and local funds).
117. See Tex. S.B. 1206 (stating funds would be shared between private and public
schools); Tex. H.B. 2395 (indicating that a public school would retain a portion of funds if a
child chose to attend a private school); Housa REsEARCH ORGA iZATION, supra note 84,
at 7 (indicating funds would be shared).
118. Three proposed bills call for a specific split of 80% following the child to his
private school and 20% remaining with the public school district. See Tex. H.B. 2395
(1997); Tex. S.B. 92, 74th Leg., R.S. (1995); Tex. H.B. 920, 73d Leg., R.S. (1993).
119. Telephone interview with Byron Schlomach, supra note 110 (responding to the
question of why such a split is significant).
120. See id.
121. See Tex. H.B. 709, 76th Leg., R.S. (1999) (stating that a private school may not
refuse admission on the basis of race, residence or academic achievement); Tex. S.B. 1206,
75th Leg., R.S. (1997) (noting that students cannot be denied admission into a private
school on the basis of academic achievement).
122. See Tex. H.B. 709 (allowing a private school to refuse admission on the basis of
prior disciplinary action); Tex. S.B. 1206 (indicating that private schools can consider a
student's prior conduct when considering admission); Tex. H.B. 2395, 75 h Leg., R.S. (1997)
(permitting private schools to discriminate on the basis of prior conduct).
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residing in the local community."2 Whether these requirements are
enough to ensure equal opportunity to all qualifying students will be an
important factor in the constitutionality of a voucher program.
5. Accountability
The area subject to the greatest debate when discussing the implemen-
tation of a voucher program is accountability. On one side of the debate
are those legislators who do not wish to impose state regulation on pri-
vate schools.'24 These legislators believe that private schools should be
free to implement the curriculum of their choice and should not be ac-
countable to the state for accreditation. ms
On the other side of the debate, however, are those legislators who
support vouchers but also want to ensure some accountability by private
schools to the state. These legislators seek to mandate that participating
private schools provide annual data on voucher students in order to allow
the state to monitor a student's progress. 26 Although the issue of ac-
countability remains underdeveloped, the issue will play an important
role in determining whether a voucher system is an efficient method of
funding public education and should not be overlooked.
IV. Is IT My TuRN YET?
Somewhere in the distance, if we listen closely, we can hear the voice of
a young child asking the question "Is it my turn yet?" The child, whose
name is Marco, is not asking about his turn on a playground ride or a turn
123. See Tex. H.B. 709 (permitting a private school to give preference to a student
currently enrolled in order to keep continuity); Tex. S.B. 1206 (allowing preference for the
sake of continuity); Tex. H.B. 2395 (providing a private school with the permission to give
preference to students already enrolled in school).
124. "Ivo of the five proposed voucher systems have been silent on the issue of ac-
countability requiring only that the private school report a child's continued enrollment to
the appropriate state agency. See Tex. S.B. 92,74th Leg., R.S. (1995); Tex. H.B. 1315, 74th
Leg., R.S. (1995).
125. See generally What Really Matters in American Education (visited Feb. 6. 1999)
<http:/lwww/ed.govlspeeches/09-1997> (discussing speech presented by former U.S. Secre-
tary of Education Richard W. Riley that vouchers reduce accountability because private
schools operate outside the jurisdiction of government authority). The U.S. Secretary of
Education mentioned in a speech that vouchers will force private and parochial schools to
become less private. See id.
126. See Tex. H.B. 709 (requiring that private schools administer an academic assess-
ment test to each student enrolled as the result of a voucher). H.B. 709 would also require
that a private school report to the State Education Commissioner on the results of the
assessment test. See id.; Tex. S.B. 1206 (requiring that an academic assessment test be
given to all voucher students and that results of such exams be reported to the State Edu-
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at bat in a baseball game-his question is more complex. Marco is asking
for his opportunity at a better education. As he sits in his classroom, he
notices the empty desks where his friends once sat and he dreams of the
day when his presence as a student will be valued. His friends received
vouchers from a private organization and now attend private schools.
When he sees them, they tell stories of computers in classrooms and sci-
ence projects done in special labs. He is happy for them but he cannot
help to wonder, "when will it be my turn?"
For children, many of whom are minorities like Marco, vouchers do
little if nothing to improve the current condition of the schools they at-
tend.12 7 His voice is one of the many children's voices proponents of
school vouchers fail to hear. In their eyes, helping a few children is better
than helping none at all." 8
This section of the Comment will present the arguments most com-
monly used by both supporters and opponents of vouchers. It will ana-
lyze proposed benefits of vouchers against the possible creation of a two
tiered educational system. Lastly, it will evaluate legal challenges to
voucher systems currently imposed in Milwaukee, Wisconsin and Cleve-
land, Ohio.
A. All in Favor Say "Yea"
Arguments in favor of vouchers can be classified into three main cate-
gories. The first and most commonly used argument is based on the the-
ory of marketplace competition.' 29 Under this theory, it is believed that
the use of vouchers breeds competition between private and public
schools. 30 According to this argument, students like Marco benefit indi-
rectly from vouchers because competition and the fear of losing educa-
127. See INTERCuLTURAL DEVELOPMENT RESEARCH ASSOCIATION, FIG1ING FOR
OUR NEIGHBORHOOD PUBLIC SCHOOLS 1 (1998) (arguing that few children will benefit
from vouchers and that public schools will not improve); Steven K. Green, The Legal Ar-
gument Against Private School Choice, 62 U. CIN. L. REv. 37, 39-40 (1993) (noting a study
conducted by the Carnegie Foundation which showed that private school choice does not
appear to improve academic achievement nor does it "stimulate public school renewal");
The Issue: Vouchers and School Choice (visited Sept. 24,1998) <http'//saturn.tasb.org/GR/
vouchers.html> (dispelling the myth that school vouchers will improve public education).
128. See Jamie Castillo, Hispanic Democrats Assail School Vouchers, SAN ATrrONIO
ExPR.ss-NEws, June 17, 1998, at 3B (citing remarks make by a supporter of vouchers to
the effect that helping some is better then none at all).
129. See O.K. Carter, Estimates Invite Closer Look at School Vouchers, FORT WORTH
STAR-TELEGRAm, Jan. 28, 1999, at 1 (explaining that the theory behind vouchers is that
opening up education to the marketplace will instill competition and lead to better
education).
130. See Allan E. Parker Jr., Parental Power Central Theme in Education Bill, THi
LONE STAR CTzIEN (Free Mkt. Found., Dallas, Tex.), Mar. 1995, at 1 (stating that a perfect
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tional funds to private schools will force public schools to improve the
quality of education they offer.131 The second argument presented by
supporters is that vouchers empower minority families with the freedom
of choice.U2 They claim that by subsidizing the cost of attending private
school, minority families are afforded opportunities once limited only to
wealthy parents.133 The last widely used argument in favor of vouchers is
that subsidizing the cost of private school leads to an efficient system of
education. t" Supporters believe private schools provide a higher quality
education for less cost.
In Texas, supporters of vouchers argue that Article VII, Section 1 of
the Texas Constitution not only permits the use of state funds to subsidize
the cost of private schools, but may also require it." In support of this
position, they point to the historical development of education in Texas
and claim that it was always the framer's intent to create a system of
school system would permit competition and as a result power would shift from public
schools to the parents).
131. Milton Friedman, an economist in the 1950's, viewed vouchers as the ideal tool to
bring marketplace competition to the educational arena. See Daniel, supra note 85, at 18;
see also John Chubb & Terry M. Moe, Give Choice a Chance, in Making Govt. Work- A
Conservative Agenda for the States 1, 21 (Tex Lexar ed. 1992) (stating that competition
forces school administrations to become more effective); Justin J. Sayfie, Comment, Edu-
cation Emancipation for Inner City Student A New Legal Paradigm for Achieving Equality
of Educational Opportunity, 48 U. MLAJru L. Rv. 913, 941 (1994) (arguing that vouchers
benefit minorities because schools are forced for the first time to listen to their demands or
risk the loss of state funds to private schools).
132. See Anastasia Cisneros- Lunsford, School Vouchers at Issue During Public Fo-
rum, SAN ANToNIo ExTiRnss-Nnws, June 6, 1998, at 1A (expressing support of the claim
that vouchers provide choice to low, middle-income, and poor people); Green, supra note
127, at 57-68 (providing the most commonly used arguments for vouchers); Parker, supra
note 83, at 4B (arguing that the only winners in the voucher issue are the low-income
parents and children who benefit).
133. See Joe Barton, Let's Give School Vouders a Chance, DALLAS MoRNmo NEWS,
May 12, 1998, at 9A (claiming that school choice means taking control out of the hands of
the government and placing it with parents); Mansour, supra note 82 (claiming that the
time has come to empower low-income parents with the ability to choose private school).
134. See Greg D. Andres, Comment, Private Sdool Vouder Remedies in Education
Cases, 62 U. Cm. L Rev. 795, 808 (arguing that the ability to enforce vouchers quickly
makes them an effective remedy for students trapped in an inadequate public school);
Dominick Cirelli, Jr., Comment, Utilizing Sdool Voucher Programs to Remedy School Fl-
nancing Problems, 30 AKRON L. REv. 469, 491-93 (1997) (presenting arguments used by
proponents that vouchers will provide a more efficient system of education); Joe Price,
Educational Reform Making the Case for Choice, 3 VA. J. Soc. POL'Y & L 435,456 (1996)
(claiming that choice in the form of vouchers vill encourage fiscal efficiency as schools will
attempt to lower operational costs in order to increase funds for classroom education).
135. See Parker, Public Free Schools, supra note 105, at 831 (presenting the argument
that school choice in Texas is not only permissible but may be constitutionally required).
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public free schools which embraced parental choice.136 The Constitu-
tional provision they believe most accurately expresses their position is
Article X, Sections I and 2 of the 1845 Texas Constitution.137 Proponents
argue that in 1845 "public schools" referred to institutions that were pri-
vate in nature, open to all children, and were supported through state
funds.1 38 "Free schools" on the other hand, referred to an ideology
rather than an entity and was considered to obligate the state to provide
for the education of the indigent and orphaned. 39 Supporters of vouch-
ers argue that the definition of "public" and "free" schools, as embraced
by the drafters of the 1845 Constitution, is the true meaning intended to
be expressed by the use of "public free school" in Article VII, Section 1
of the 1876 Constitution.140
B. All Opposed Say "Nay"
Opponents of vouchers argue that no school intentionally sets out to
provide inadequate education. Instead, it is often the consequence of
poor state funding, an element that is usually beyond a school district's
control. 4 ' If a school district is properly funded, they can hire qualified
teachers, they can modify curricula to offer enrichment programs, and
they can purchase modem technology.142 Opponents argue that the dis-
tribution of vouchers to a few students fails to address this crucial issue
136. See id. at 833 (stating that consideration of choice as an implied right must begin
with a historical analysis of events which may have influenced the adoption of our current
education provision in 1876).
137. Section 1 of Article X called for the legislature to "make suitable provision for
the support and maintenance of public schools," while Section 2 commanded the establish-
ment of "free schools." See TEx. CONST. of 1845, art. X, §§ 1, 2; Parker, Public Free
Schools, supra note 105, at 833 (discussing the significance of the term "public school"
found in Section one of Article X).
138. See Parker, Public Free Schools, supra note 105, at 833-36 (defining "public
school" and "free school" in the context of the understanding of the terms in 1845).
139. See id. at 834 (distinguishing the definition of "public school" as held by Texas
citizens in 1845, from that held by contemporary society).
140. See id. at 836 (stating that an attempt in 1845 to establish a system of education
as found in today's society would have been considered tyranny).
141. See Cirelli, supra note 134, at 470 (expressing the view held by opponents that
efficiency is not the problem with public schools, but that the problem lies with a lack of
state and federal support). But see Jonathan B. Cleveland, School Choice: American Ele-
mentary and Secondary Education Enter the "Adapt or Die" Environment of a Competitive
Marketplace, 29 J. MARSHAUL. L. Rnv. 75,79 (1995) (stating that schools do not suffer from
under funding, but misdirect funds to resources that do little to improve education).
142. See Group Praises LULAC Stand, Taxpayer-Aided Vouchers Hurt Public Schools,
They Say, DALLAS MOING NEws, June 9,1998, at 15A (adopting a resolution against the
implementation of vouchers stating that public tax funds could go to reduce class sizes,
hired qualified teachers, and obtain adequate classroom facilities).
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and instead undermines support for public education. 14  Rather than
making additional funds available to schools most in need, vouchers take
financial resources away.'" They argue that while competition may force
the closure of weaker schools, such closings will only harm students such
as Marco who through no fault of their own would find themselves with
no place to go.145
Opponents are concerned that vouchers will create a dual system of
education, which divides students along racial and economic lines. 146
They argue that private schools are academically selective and are also ill
equipped to provide services to disabled students. 147 As a result, learning
impaired or disabled children will be forced to remain in public school. 4 '
Because proposed voucher systems often target low-income students or
students attending a low performing school district, the majority of stu-
dents affected will be minorities. 4 9 Opponents worry these students will
143. See Cirelli, supra note 134, at 495 (referring to a compelling argument against
vouchers which states that their distribution help only a few students and does nothing to
improve the overall education system).
144. See Green, supra note 127, at 39 (providing the argument that use of state funds
for vouchers takes precious money away from already shrinking state education budgets).
145. See Larry Cuban, Education Housing, Not School, Vouchers Are Best Remedy for
Failing Schools, LA. Tn~ms, Jan. 31, 1999, at M2 (expressing that vouchers will help some
students but will offer little to those trapped in a cycle of poverty).
146. See DAVID C. BiRLnp & BRUcr. J. BRInDLP THE MANuFAcuRr CIsIS:.
MyraHs, FRAUD, Am = ATTACK oN A1mca's Putuc ScnooLs 173 (1995) (citing a
colleague's view that vouchers would mark the end of any effort to improve public educa-
tion, and the beginning of a two-tiered educational system); see also James S. Liebman,
Voice Not Choice, 101 YALE L.J. 259,283 (1991) (book review) (arguing that applying the
marketplace theory to education will lead to segregation because as with any other market,
consumers get what they pay for and poor minorities can't purchase the same as wealthier
individuals); Rick Martinez, Some Officials Wary of Senate Approved School Fund Vouch-
ers, Luna Warns of Potential Caste System, SAN AIrroNmo ExyaEss-Naws, Mar. 29, 1995,
available in 1995 WL 5555310 (discussing the possible creation of dual system of education
with the unwanted students remaining in public schools).
147. See Mei-lan E. Wong, Note, The Implications of School Coice for Children with
Disabilities, 103 YALE LJ 827, 829 (1993) (commenting on the rights of disabled children
to participate in school choice programs and the need to take into consideration their
needs when programs are drafted because even the most skillfully drafted legislation will
find it hard to comply with the IDEA); Lucy Hood, Teachers Group is Quizzing Private
Schools on Vouchers, SAN ANrromo ExPaRss-Nnws, Jan. 22, 1999, at 7B (demonstrating
that two out of four prestigious private schools in Texas state that they would not partici-
pate in a voucher program if it meant they had to take students who otherwise would not
be qualified to attend their schools).
148. See Castillo, supra note 128 (interviewing Joe Bernal, a member of the State
Board of Education, who stated that he believes that taking funds away from public
schools will only harm those students left behind).
149. See TExAs EDUCArION AGENcy, supra note 115 (listing statistical data for indi-
vidual school districts which indicate that Bexar County has seven school districts where
1999]
25
Galindo: Do Minorities Really Benefit? The Untold Truth About Vouchers
Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University, 2018
THE SCHOLAR
be become disenfranchised and at even greater risk of dropping out of
school.
In addition, private schools under the proposed legislation will be al-
lowed to give admittance preference to the siblings of students already
attending their school as well as to residents within its immediate commu-
nity.150 The result of such preference is that qualifying families unable to
find private schools within their community will be forced to travel
greater distances and incur greater expenses. 151
Educational organizations, such as the National Education Association
(NEA) and the Texas Association of School Boards (TASB), oppose the
use vouchers, and have joined in the fight to prevent the implementation
of a state funded program. 52 The NEA warns not only its membership
but all individuals concerned about public education, to be aware of the
myths proponents of vouchers use to gain support for their cause. 5 3 The
NEA argues that vouchers undermine public education and are a fiscally
irresponsible method of education reform. 4 The TASB argues that
70% or more of the students are classified as economically disadvantaged; in those seven
districts, Hispanics make up more than 80% of the student population).
150. See Telephone Interview with Byron Schlomach, Legislative Aide, State Repre-
sentative Grusendorf (Sept. 1998) (on file with The Scholar: St Mary's Law Review on
Minority Issues) (responding that although a private school cannot discriminate on the
basis of academic achievement, it can use residency as a factor).
151. See UNrvERsrrY OF NORTH TeexAs, CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF EDUCATON RE.
FoRM, FiNAL REPORT. SAN ANTONIO SCHOOL CHOICE RESEARCH PRojEc" 12 (June
1997) (discussing student attrition among those who participated in school choice programs
including a private voucher system). A study produced by the Center for the Study of
Education Reform showed that the drop out rate for students transferring from public to
private schools over-a period of three years was 49.6%. See id. The Texas study also
showed that the parents of children who dropped out of private school had originally made
the decision to transfer their child from public school out of frustration with the public
school system. See id. Once having made the switch, the parents found that the location of
the private school was too far from their home and that they could not afford the added
expenses of transportation, uniforms, books, and other supplies. See id.
152. See Texas Association of School Boards, Grassroots Issues for the 76th Legislature
(visited Mar. 9, 1999) <http://www.tasb.org.html> (providing background information on
the Texas Legislature's position on school vouchers and informing its membership on the
organization's opposition to vouchers); National Education Association, NEA's Position on
Vouchers (visited Mar. 8, 1999) <http'/.www.nea.orglissues/vouchers/position.html> (ex-
pressing the organization's opposition to vouchers through the adoption of resolution A-
29).
153. See National Education Association, Private School Vouchers, (visited Mar.8,
1999) <http:llwww.nea.orgllaclpapers/vouchers.html> (listing eight reasons why school
vouchers undermine public education).
154. See id. (arguing that the use of vouchers in Milwaukee and Cleveland shifted
public funds which could have been used to reduce class sizes to private schools which
retain the right to reject or accept students). The NEA believes vouchers provide help for
only a few students and cites as example the proposed implementation of a voucher pro-
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Texas should learn from existing voucher programs in Milwaukee and
Cleveland that the use of tax dollars to subsidize the cost of education at
a private school does not guarantee improvement in the quality of educa-
tion a child receives. 5
C. Arguments Used in Challenging the Constitutionality of Established
Voucher Programs in Milvaukee and Cleveland
In the Unites States, only Milwaukee and Cleveland currently have an
established voucher program. Legal challenges against both programs
have been initiated, and although state issues have been raised, the pri-
mary argument is that the use of state funds at a religious school violates
the Establishment Clause of the U.S. Constitution. 156 In Milwaukee, the
Wisconsin Supreme Court reversed the holdings of the appellate and trial
court and instead found that the Milwaukee Parental Choice Program
(VMPCP) did not violate the Establishment Clause.1' 7 Evaluating the pro-
gram using the Lemon v. Kurtzman test,"5 the court held that the MPCP
had a secular purpose to provide for the education of low-income chil-
dren. 5 9 Secondly, the court did not find that the program advanced or
inhibited religious beliefs in any way.160 Lastly, the court found that the
program did not require excessive government entanglement.16' In
reaching its decision, the court focused on the fact that state funds were
gram in the District of Columbia which is expected to cost taxpayers seven million dollars
to educate 2000 children in private schools. See 1&
155. See Texas Association of School Board, The Legislative Report, Vouchers Con-
tinue to Be Critical Issue Facing Texas Public Schools (visited Mar. 9, 1999) <bttp://
www.tasb.org.html> (providing ten reasons why vouchers should be opposed).
156. See Jackson v. Benson, 578 N.W.2d 602, 607 (1998) (explaining the issues raised
by the plaintiffs on appeal); Simmons-Harris v. Goff, Nos. 96APEOS-982, 96APE03-991
1997 WL 217583, at *2 (Ohio App. 10 Dist.) (1997) (discussing the facts and issue of the
case).
157. See Jackson, 578 N.W.2d at 607 (holding that the MPCP does not violate the
Establishment Clause or the Wisconsin Constitution). See generally David Schimmel, IViS-
consin Supreme Court Approves Vouchers for Parochial Schools: An Analysis of Jackson v.
Beason, WEsT's ED. L. Rm., Jan. 1999, available in 130 WELR 373 (summarizing the
Wisconsin Supreme Court's decision). But see Recent Cases, 112 HlARv. L Rnv. 589, 737
(1999) (claiming that the Wrsconsin Supreme Court misapplied the Lemon v Kurtzman
test and should have found excessive entanglement).
158. See Jackson, 578 N.W.2d at 612 (determining whether the MPCP had a secular
purpose, did not inhibit or advance religious beliefs, or required excessive government
entanglement).
159. See id. (finding that MPCP had secular purpose of providing education to low-
income families).
160. See id. at 614 (concluding that educational assistance to religious schools under
the MPCP was neutral).
161. See id. at 617 (holding that the MFCP provides a religious neutral benefit as
parents are free to choose the school that is best for their child).
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provided directly to parents. 62 The fact that a religious school only re-
ceived state aid if selected was a key factor in the court's nind.163 An-
other important factor for the court was that parents could choose not to
send their child to a religious school and still participate in the pro-
gram.t  Such a choice prevented the state from advancing religious be-
liefs.16 The plaintiff's appealed to the United States Supreme Court but
were denied writ of certiorari. 66
In Cleveland, the Ohio Appellate Court, applying the same test as the
Wisconsin Supreme Court, reached a different conclusion. 167 The appel-
late court found that the Ohio program had a secular purpose, however,
the program failed to meet the remaining two prongs in the Lemon v.
Kurtzman test.'6 8 The court found that the program, although facially
neutral, did in fact advance religious beliefs because state funds were con-
sidered direct aid.'69 In reaching its decision, the court looked to the fact
that not a single private or public school chose to accept vouchers.'70
Parents, therefore, who wished to participate were forced to choose a
religious school."' The limitation of participating schools, in turn, made
the use of state funds a direct assistance. The State has appealed this
decision and the case is pending before the Ohio Supreme Court.
What we can learn from the U.S. Supreme Court's decision to deny
writ is that the issue of education for the present time continues to remain
a state issue. As far as future challenges at the state level, it appears that
a key factor in upholding the use of vouchers at a religious school will be
the based the amount of choice afforded to participating parents. The
number of private and religious schools participating must be such that a
parent is not forced to send their child to a religious school.
162. See ad at 618 (justifying the decision on the basis that because state aide arrives
at a religious school only by way of a parent's choice, there is no state involvement).
163. See id. at 617 (stating that parents had the option to opt-out of the program If
they so desired so the state was not advancing religious views).
164. See Jackson, 578 N.W.2d at 617.
165. See iL (stating that neutrality is not dependant upon what school is chosen but
rather who chooses the state or the parent).
166. See Recent Cases, 112 HARv. L. REv. 713, 737-42 (1999) (providing procedural
history on the case and arguing that the Court's decision may have been erroneous).
167. See Simmon-Harris v. Goff, Nos.96APE08-982, 96APE08-991 1997 WL 217583
*8 (Ohio App. 10 Dist.) (1997) (holding that scholarship program provides direct and sub-
stantial assistance to religious schools and there violates the Establishment Clause).
168. See id. at *4 (stating that the program provided direct aid thus advancing reli.
gious beliefs).
169. See id. at *7 (acknowledging the fact that the program appears to be facially
neutral but advising that not a single non-religious school chose to participate).
170. See id. (emphasizing that lack of choice in the school a parent could send their
child lead to Court to find that state funds were direct aide).
171. See id. (indicating that lack of choice skews the program toward religion).
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V. ARE VouCHERs AN EFFICIENT METHOD OF EDUCATIONAL
FUNDING? THE FRAMER'S INTENT AND
EDGEWOOD REVISrTED
Despite opposition by representatives of minority and low-property
value school districts,' 72 supporters of a voucher program are confident
that legislation authorizing a pilot program will pass the Texas House and
Senate in the 1999 Legislative Session. 3  This section will examine what
the framers of the Texas Constitution intended when crafting Article VII,
Section 1.174 It will evaluate the "efficiency" standard set forth by the
Texas Supreme Court in the series of Edgewood decisions17 5 and will
summarize the disparities a voucher system is anticipated to create.
Lastly, it will determine whether a voucher system, as an alternative
method of education funding, would meet the efficiency standard found
in Article VII, Section 1 of the Texas Constitution or fail in light of the
Texas Supreme Court's interpretation.
A. The Framers' Intent
Contrary to what proponents of vouchers believe," 6 an historical anal-
ysis of Article VII, Section 1 reveals that the framers of the Texas Consti-
tution intended to establish a system of publicly funded schools for the
education of all Texas children. It was the intention of the state's forefa-
172. See generally Anastasia Cisneros-Lunsford, Rally Rips Vouders, Backs Public
Schools, SAN ANTomo ExRinss-Nsws, Mar. 7, 1999, at 1A (reporting on a rally held by
opponents of school vouchers at which they expressed their support for public education);
Stutz, supra note 8 (voicing her opposition to vouchers).
173. See Kent Grusendorf, Pilot School Voucher Programs Should Be Given a Try,
Aus-riN AM.-STATrEsNLAN, June 2, 1998, at A9 (claiming that it is only a matter of time
before legislation enacting a voucher program will pass).
174. See Thx CONST. art. VII, § 1 (mandating that the Texas legislature provide for an
"efficient" system of public free schools).
175. See Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Meno, 917 S.W.2d 717, 732 (Tex. 1995)
[Edgewood IV] (holding that an efficient system does not require equal funding at all
levels, a school district may supplement funds in order to provide for enrichment pro-
grams); Carrollton-Farmers Branch Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist., 826
S.W.2d 489, 510 (Tex. 1992) [Edgewood III] (noting that the State could not levy an ad
valorem tax in an effort to create an "efficient" system of funding); Edgewood Indep. Sch.
Dist. v. Kirby, 804 S.W.2d 491, 500 (Tex. 1991) [Edgewood I] (indicating that an efficient
system of funding would not require heavy reliance on local funding in order for the state
to fulfill its Constitutional obligation); Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d
391,397 (Tex. 1989) [Edgewood 1] (holding that the Texas system of funding education was
neither financially efficient nor efficient in providing for the general diffusion of
knowledge).
176. See Parker, Public Free Schools, supra note 105, at 831 (stating that choice
whether in the form of school vouchers or tuition payments may be a constitutional right
under the 1876 Texas Constitution).
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thers to create a provision that would evolve with the needs of society
and would ultimately permit the Legislature to comply with its constitu-
tional duty of providing for an efficient system of public free schools.
177
The first evidence of the state's desire to establish a public school sys-
tem can be traced to an education provision found in the 1827 Constitu-
tion of the State of Coahuila and Texas. 78 The provision called for the
establishment of primary schools in every town. However, poverty pre-
vented Texas citizens from financially contributing to the effort, and the
mandate failed. 17 9 When Texas later gained her independence from Mex-
ico, a lack of support from the Mexican government for the establishment
of a public school system was listed in the Declaration of Independence
as a reason for separation.'8 0 In 1836, Texas once again expressed its de-
sire for a public school system when it adopted an education provision in
Texas Republic Constitution, calling for the establishment of a general
education system as soon as circumstances permitted.18' Land grants
177. See Edgewood I, 777 S.W.2d at 394 (stating that when interpreting provisions of
the Texas Constitution it is important to remember that it is an organic document ratified
for the purpose of governing society as it evolved); see also SEm SHEPARD McKAY, DE,.
BATES IN THE TExAs CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENnON OF 1875, 330 (1930) (debating on the
issue of taxes as a method of funding education, Mr. West of the Education Committee,
stated that although citizens may not be fully supportive of free schools at this point, it was
the responsibility of the delegates to place before the citizens of Texas an "organic" law
they could adopt). See generally Mikal Watts & Brad Rockwell, The Original Intent of the
Education Article of the Texas Constitution, 21 ST. MARY'S LJ. 771 (1990) (concluding that
the framers of the 1876 Texas Constitution intended to impose a prospective upon the
legislature to provide for an efficient system of education).
178. See TEx. CoNsT. art. VII, § 1 interp. commentary (Vernon 1993) (explaining the
history of education in Texas); BRADEN, supra note 18, at 505 (providing historical back-
ground on the development of education provisions found in various Texas Constitutions);
J.J. LANE, HISTORY OF EDUCATION IN TEXAs, 23 (1903) (discussing the education provi-
sion contained in the 1827 State of Coahuila and Texas Constitution).
179. See TEx. CONST. art. VII, § 1 interp. commentary (Vernon 1993) (explaining that
education under the Constitution of Mexico was the responsibility of individual states); see
also BRADEN, supra note 18, at 505 (discussing the first constitutional command for a pub-
lib system of education).
180. See Thx. CoNsr. art. VII, § 1 interp. commentary (Vernon 1993) (noting that
neglect of public education was charged against the Mexican Government in the Texas
Declaration of Independence); BRADEN, supra note 18, at 505 (noting that Texas' griev-
ances against Mexico for their lack of a public education system was unwarranted); LANE,
supra note 178, at 26 (explaining the importance in Texas history and the role it played in
declaring independence from Mexico).
181. See RPu&. TEx. CONST. of 1836, general provisions, § 5, reprinted in 1 H.P.N.
GAmm., THE LAvs OF TEXAS 1822-1897, at 1078-79 (Austin, Gammel Book Co. 1898)
(calling on the State's congress to develop a general system of education); Tnx. CONsT. art.
VII, § 1 interp. commentary (Vernon 1993) (commenting on the expressed desire to create
a general system of schools as soon as circumstances would permit); BRADEN, supra note
18, at 505 (citing General Provisions, Section 5 and noting its indefiniteness).
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were distributed to counties for the establishment of schools, but actual
funding was scarce."an In addition, Anglo settlers in 1836 were adamantly
opposed to the imposition of a state tax for the purpose of funding educa-
tion.a As a result, from 1836 to the early 1840s, the responsibility of
educating children remained with private institutions."s
The 1840s proved to be a pivotal time in the development of a publicly
funded school system, as German immigrants began calling Texas
home.ls" Accustomed to the European and Northern system of educa-
tion, German immigrants believed that it was the State's obligation to
provide for the education of children. 8 6 By 1845, conflict in educational
philosophies arose between the Southern Aristocrat and the German Im-
migrant.1' 7 The Southern Aristocrat believed education was a private
function and should be free from state interference.s The only obliga-
tion the state owed was to the poor and orphaned children who could not
afford to attend private school. 18 9 German immigrants, on the other
hand, believed that free education should be provided to all children and
passionately vocalized their desire for a system of free schools. 90 When
the State Constitutional Convention was held in 1845, the conflict in phi-
losophies resulted in compromise by the drafters of the 1845 Constitu-
tion.19' The provision adopted was Article X Sections 1 and 2.'92 Section
I required the legislature to "make suitable provision for the support and
182. See Tmn. Cors-r. art. VII, § 1 interp. commentary (Vernon 1993) (providing his-
torical background on the financial condition of Texas citizens in 1836); BRADEN, supra
note 18, at 505 (discussing economical factors which influenced the state's ability to estab-
lish a general system of schools).
183. See BRADEN, supra note 18, at 505 (indicating that opposition to the use of state
funds for education made the establishment of a general school system difficult to fulfill).
184. See id. (noting that the burden of education in 1836 fell on the shoulders of pri-
vate schools).
185. See id at 505 (reflecting on the various philosophies of education held by Texans
in the 1840's).
186. See id. (distinguishing the German immigrants' philosophy that the state should
fund education from the ideologies held by Southern aristocrats, who believed that aid
should only be provided for the indigent).
187- See TEx. CONsT. art. VII, § 1 interp. commentary (Vernon 1993) (describing the
two types of schools created in 1845); BRADEN, supra note 18, at 505 (discussing the differ-
ent educational philosophies present in 1845); D. Walker, Intent of the Framers in the Edu-
cation Provisions of the Texas Constitution of 1876, 10 Rlv. Lmo. 625, 634 (1991) (stating
that Education in 1845 meant private & public enterprises).
188. See BRADEN, supra note 18, at 505 (explaining philosophy held by Southern
aristocrats).
189. In such instances, the state was obligated to financially subsidize the cost of the
child's education at a private institution. See id.
190. See id. (detailing the educational views held by German immigrants).
191. See Tm, CONST. art. VII, § I interp. commentary (Vernon 1993) (acknowledging
that as a compromise, the 1845 Constitution provided for "public schools" and "free
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maintenance of public schools" while Section 2 mandated the legislature
to establish "free schools" as early as practicable.193 The Southern Aris-
tocrat viewed the adoption of Article X as a victory. In their eyes, Sec-
tion 1 clearly permitted the use of state funds to assist private schools.
194
Section 2 was interpreted to require the state to provide for the education
of only the poor and orphaned.195 Although German immigrants, as well
as advocates for free schools, considered Section 2 as support for their
ideas, the legislature failed to enact legislation specifically establishing
free schools.196 Despite the expressed intent to provide for a publicly
funded system of schools, education in 1845 remained in the hands of
private schools that accepted state funds.197
The desire for a publicly funded school system remained a forefront
issue and in 1869 during the Reconstruction period, a concerted effort
was made once again to establish a true system of free schools.1 98 In
1869, the drafters of the Reconstruction Constitution adopted an educa-
tion provision that was considered by far the most radical proposal of its
schools"); BaDmN, supra note 18, at 506 (distinguishing the two sections contained within
Article X, Section 1).
192. See TEX. CONST. of 1845, art. X, §§ 1, 2 (calling upon the Legislature to support
and maintain public schools and to provide for the establishment of free schools as soon
practicable). The drafters of the 1845 Constitution viewed the State's duty to establish free
schools as important because Section 2 required the state to provide the necessary funds.
See iL
193. See TEx. CoNrsT. of 1845, art. X, §§ 1, 2 (mandating the legislature to provide for
public schools but permitting the establishment of free schools over time); TEx. CoNsT. art.
VII, § 1 interp. commentary (Vernon 1993) (differentiating between public schools and
free schools); BRADEN, supra note 18, at 506 (discussing the content of Article X, Sections
1 and 2).
194. See TEx. CONsT. art. VII, § 1 interp. commentary (Vernon 1993) (commenting on
the interpretation of Article X, Section I to mean that the State was required to support
private schools); BRADEN, supra note 18, at 506 (interpreting section one to mean the
continuation of state funds at private schools).
195. See id. (stating that Article X, Section 2 of the 1845 Constitution was interpreted
to mean that the state had the obligation to pay for the education of orphaned or indigent);
BRADEN, supra note 18, at 506 (noting that the interpretation of section two as providing
for the tuition payment of the orphaned and indigent was consistent with the sentiment at
the time).
196. See TEx. CONsT. art. VII, § 1 interp. commentary (Vernon 1993) (noting that
unfortunately legislation in support of free schools was never enacted).
197. See id. (indicating that the 1845 Constitution's reference to public schools in 1845
referred to private schools).
198. See TEx. CoNsr. of 1869, art. IX, §§ 1, 4 (mandating the establishment of a public
system of education); TEX. CONST. art. VII, § 1 interp. commentary (Vernon 1993) (ex-
plaining the significance of the education provision adopted in 1869); BRADEN, supra note
18, at 506 (analyzing the duty Article IX, Sections I and 4 imposed on the legislature).
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time.' 9 9 The provision called for the establishment of a system "of public
free schools, for the gratuitous instruction of all the inhabitants of this
State, between the ages of six and eighteen years."2 ' The system was to
have a centralized administration and would obtain funding through the
imposition of a school tax.2 0 ' The tax was viewed by a "large group of
Texans as an illegal act to compel one man to pay for the education of
another man's child." ' 2 Unable to secure proper funding, the legisla-
ture's attempt to create a system of free schools failed and the State was
left with a deficit of over four million dollars.3
The struggle between those who wished to continue the support of pri-
vate schools and those who desired a publicly funded system of education
came to a head in 1875. With renewed Democrats once again in control,
a heated battle over which educational philosophy would prevail took
place at the 1875 Constitutional Convention.2 All delegates present at
the Convention agreed that the education of every child was important if
Texas wished to produce a democratic and productive citizenry, but how
the state would fulfill its obligation was a matter of great debate.' ° On
one side of the aisle were members of the convention who desired the
establishment of a statewide system of free schools." 5 On the other side
were members who longed for a return to the old system of private edu-
199. See TEx. CoNsr. art. VII, § 1 interp. commentary (Vernon 1993) (referring to
Article IX as a northern concept of education and a marked departure from Texas tradi-
tion); BRADEN, supra note 18, at 506 (noting the provision was a radical departure from the
traditional private school education).
200. Tax. CONST. of 1869, art. IX, § 1.
201. See TEx. CONsr. of 1869, art. DC § 3 (requiring that the education system have a
highly centralized administration); Walker, supra note 187, at 641 (explaining that the Con-
stitution of 1869 provided for a centralized system of public schools, an idea which was
opposed by many Texans).
202. TEX. CONsT. art. VII, § 1 interp. commentary (Vernon 1993).
203. See BRADEN, supra note 18, at 506 (explaining why most Texans hated a publicly
funded system of education).
204. See TEx. CONsr. art. VII, § I interp. commentary (Vernon 1993) (stating that the
bitterest fight at the 1875 Constitutional Convention was fought over education); BRADEN,
supra note 18, at 506 (explaining that the building anger over the financial effects of the
1969 education provision lead to a heated battle between political parties at the 1875 Con-
vention); Walker, supra note 187, at 644 (noting that the most hotly contested issue at the
convention was education).
205. See McKAY, supra note 177, at 199 (describing Mr. Dohoney's, comments on the
need for education as a way to uphold the virtue of society and to become a safer citi-
zenry). Mr. West commented that our forefathers recognized the importance of education
in maintaining civil liberty and democracy. See id. at 331.
206. See JOURNAL OF THE CONSTITUTONAL CoNVENMON OF -ma STAT OF TEXAS
63-64 (1875) (arguing on the issue of education Mr. DeMorse introduced a resolution for
calling for the establishment of school districts and the levying of taxes for the purpose of
creating a public system of schools); McKAY, supra note 177, at 215-16 (speaking in favor
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cation.2 °7 In the middle, were those delegates who recognized the need
for a system of free schools but feared that such a system would produce
results identical to those encountered in 1869.208 For these moderate
members, an acceptable education provision was one that would allow for
a gradual implementation of a statewide system of free schools. 209 After
numerous debates, a compromise was reached and Article VII, Section 1
of the 1876 Texas Constitution was adopted.21 0 The provision, like its
predecessor in 1869, once again marked a departure from the traditional
private system of education.21 Although the language of Article VII,
Section 1 contains the phrase "public free schools," upon reading the
transcripts of the Constitutional debates held in 1875, it is evident that the
drafters of the Constitution no longer viewed "public schools" and "free
schools" as separate entities.212 Instead, the provision was intended to
of free schools, Mr. Cline read a letter from his constituent stating that poor people could
not afford a private system of education and are in need of public education).
207. See McKAY, supra note 177, at 219 (arguing against the support of public school
through taxation, Mr. Sansom stated that he knew of not one person in his constituency
who would support the idea of common schools funded by taxes). Mr. Flournoy voiced his
opposition to a system of public free schools supported by taxation. He held that govern-
ment should not force citizens to support education. See id. at 225.
208. See id. at 224 (voicing his desire for a system of free schools, Mr. McLean also
expressed his concern that the lack of state funds would doom any attempt to the same fate
already experienced). Mr. Johnson also spoke out in favor of free schools but recognized
the prejudice against a system like the one enacted in 1869. See id. at 341. Mr. Whitefield
expressed his concern that taxation in 1875 would be a burden for Texas citizens, however,
he was aware that the foundation had been laid for the future development of a system of
common schools. See id. at 196-97.
209. See McKAy, supra note 177, at 327 (debating public education, Mr. West spoke
out in favor of free schools). He noted the importance of education but recognized that
financial uncertainty within the state might prohibit the citizens of the State to support
such a dramatic change. See id. Mr. West wanted to ensure that whatever provision was
adopted that it in no way prevented future Legislators from establishing a system of free
schools. See id. Mr. Russell spoke in favor of free schools stating it was the responsibility
of the delegates to carry out the sentiment of the people and the people wanted a system of
free schools. See id. at 332.* 210. See TEx. CoNsr. art. VII, § 1 interp. commentary (Vernon 1993) (explaining the
political and social environment leading to the adoption of Article VII, Section 1); BRA.
DEN, supra note 8, at 506 (detailing the circumstances leading to the adoption of Article
VII, Section 1).
211. See TEx. CONST. art. VII, § 1 interp. commentary (Vernon 1993) (providing com-
mentary on the language of Article VII, Section 1); BRADEN, supra note 18, at 506 (dis-
cussing how Article VII, Section 1 has been interpreted).
212. Prior to 1875 the term "public school" referred to private schools accepting state
funds in lieu of tuition, while "free schools" referred to the state's obligation to subsidize
the cost of attending private school for the orphaned and indigent. See BRADEN supra note
18, at 505 (providing information on the evolution of Article VII, Section 1). During the
constitutional debates in 1875, members of the delegation used the terms interchangeably
by referring to a publicly funded school system as either public education or free schools.
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provide the legislature with the flexibility to develop a system of schools,
which in time would provide for the public education of all Texas
children.21
As a compromise to those who feared the recreation of a public system
like the one enacted in 1869, the drafters of Article VII, Section 1 in-
serted the term "efficient" as a means to guide the legislature in establish-
ig a productive system.214 While opposition to change existed for a
short period after Article VII, Section 1 was adopted, a complete shift in
public sentiment away from private education occurred in the mid-
1880s. 215 In 1883, when local schools districts were created and granted
the authority to tax, the intent of the framers to establish a system of
"public free schools" began its evolution into what today is referred to as
the Texas public school system.21 6 The drafters of the 1876 Constitution
understood the importance of public education and their intent can be
summarized in the following statement presented during debate:
I concede it would be better to have the children educated and ren-
dered virtuous by a system of private education; but when we look
abroad in the land and find the large number of orphans, and large
number of children of the poor people, and the large per cent unedu-
cated, the large number which private education can never reach or
benefit, and ignorance growing up with crime and vice and intemper-
ance, we know well that nothing short of public education will reach
the case.
m217
B. An Efficient System According to Edgewood
Because the use of state funds to subsidize private education was not
intended to be an implied right found in Article VII, Section 1, the imple-
See McKAY, supra note 177 at 197, 200 (during debates delegates referred to free schools,
public education, and public free schools).
213. See McKAY supra note 177, at 196, 224, 342 (voicing support for the concept of
public education itself, some delegates to the Constitutional Convention desired a gradual
development of such a school system).
214. See Thx. CONSr. art. VII, § I interp. commentary (Vernon 1993) (providing anal-
ysis as to why the term "efficient" was inserted into the text of Article VII, Section 1);
BRADEN supra note 18, at 506 (interpreting the use of the term "efficient").
215. See Thx. CONSr. art. VII, § 1 interp. commentary (Vernon 1993) (explaining that
an unsuccessful attempt was made after the 1875 convention to continue the traditional
system of private education); BRAD N supra note 18, at 506 (discussing the attempt to
continue the traditional system of private education and the financial debt it created when
it failed).
216. See BrADmr supra note 18, at 506 (noting that the mid 1800s marked the first
step towards establishing a public school system).
217. See Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391, 397 (Tex. 19S9)
[Edgewvood I]; see also McKAY, supra note 177, at 200.
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mentation of a voucher system must be regarded as an alternative
method of funding public education. As such, any voucher system imple-
mented by the Texas Legislature would be required to meet the efficiency
standard set forth by the Texas Supreme Court in Edgewood v. Kirby.2 18
1. What is Required for a, Funding System to Pass Constitutional
Muster?
In Edgewood 1, the Texas Supreme Court held that Article VII, Section
1 imposed a constitutional duty on the Texas legislature to establish an
efficient system of public free schools.219 For an education system to be
efficient, the court held that Article VII, Section 1 required two ele-
ments.' ° First, an education system must be financially efficient and sec-
ondly, it must provide for the general diffusion of knowledge. "
The Texas Supreme Court has defined financially efficient to mean that
the state must use all available resources with little waste, in order to
ensure that every child has equal access to educational fundsI In other
words, the resources available to a district have to directly relate to its tax
effort'z For an education system to provide for the general diffusion of
knowledge, the court has indicated that the State must guarantee that
every district has the resources necessary to meet state accreditation. 4
In addition, a system which provides for the general diffusion of knowl-
218. Edgewood 1, 777 S.W.2d at 397 (holding a efficient system of education must be
financially efficient and must provide for the general diffusion of knowledge).
219. See id. at 394 (determining that Article VII, Section 1 imposes an affirmative
duty on the Texas Legislature to establish public free schools).
220. See id. at 397 (explaining that the Texas system of funding education violated
Article VII, Section I because it was financially inefficient and it failed to provide for the
general diffusion of knowledge).
221. See id. at 395-97 (defining "financially efficient" and "general diffusion of knowl-
edge"); Allan E. Parker, Jr. & Michael David Weiss, Litigating Edgewood Constitutional
Standards and Application to Educational Choice, 10 Rnv. Lrnri. 599, 602 (1991) (listing
elements required for an educational provision to be found constitutional).
222. See Edgewood 1, 777 S.W.2d at 395,397 (stating that because the term "efficient"
continues to have the same meaning it did in 1874, and because of the disparity in the
conveyance of knowledge within school districts, the system no longer meets the definition
of the term efficient); Kauffman & Rumbaut, supra note 50, at 76 (discussing the factors
that lead the Texas Supreme Court to define an efficient school system as non-wasteful).
223. See Edgeiwood 1, 777 S.W.2d at 397 (mandating that an educational resources of a
school district must correlate with its tax effort).
224. See id. at 392 (determining that the state's system of funding education failed to
provide for a general diffusion of knowledge because the disparities which existed at the
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edge ensures that all children are afforded a similar educational experi-
ence regardless of where they live.-
2. Factors Considered by the Texas Supreme Court When Reaching
Its Decision in Edgewood v. Kirby
Upon examining the disparities among the school districts at the time
Edgeivood I was decided, the Texas Supreme Court held that the state
system of funding education violated Article VII, Section 1 of the Texas
Constitution." 6 The court found that the funding system failed to be fi-
nancially efficient because property poor districts were denied equal ac-
cess to educational funds. 27 Taxing at a higher rate than wealthier
districts, property poor districts, as a result of their low tax base, contin-
ued to raise significantly less revenue 8 As a result, local revenues
raised by poorer districts were being used to either pay on debt or to
meet state accreditation standards2 9 Wealthier districts, on the other
hand, were able to use local funds for enrichment programs? 0 Although
the state did provide aid to poorer districts, the amount was insufficient
to makeup for the disparities in local revenue." x
The Court concluded that the ability of a district to raise local revenue
had an effect on the education it offered its students.2 The state's sys-
tem of funding failed to provide for the general diffusion of knowledge
because children attending poorer districts were not afforded the same
educational experience as children attending wealthier districts? - A stu-
dent in a wealthier district was provided a broader educational experi-
ence because the district could afford to offer a better curriculum, better
225. See id. at 391, 396 (interpreting Article VII to mean that all citizens regardless of
where they live are entitled to an efficient system of education, and the legislature failed to
fulfill this obligation).
226. See Id. at 397 (finding that the State's system of funding education violates Arti-
cle VII, Section 1 of the Texas Constitution).
227. See id. (explaining that the Texas system of funding education was inefficient
because children were not provided equal access to educational funds).
228. See id. at 392 (describing the inability of a school district poor in property value
to generate local revenue).
229. See Edgewood , 777 S.W2d at 392 (discussing how the lack of sufficient state
funds for school facilities or for debt services, forced low-property districts to use a greater
portion of local funds to meet its obligations).
230. See id. (highlighting the disparities existing in school districts as a result of prop-
erty value).
231. See id. (recognizing the state's efforts to lessen disparities).
232. See id. at 393 (emphasizing that a district's ability to generate funds does impact
the quality of the education it provides).
233. See id. at 396 (concluding that the funding system in existence at the time
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technology, better libraries and better equipment." 4 School districts
poor in property value, were not even able to meet state-mandated stan-
dards for classP3 5 While additional state funds would reduce some of the
disparities, it would only be a "band-aid;" the structure of the educational
funding system itself needed to be changed." 6
3. The State's Attempts to Comply with Edgewood v. Kirby
Upon rendering its decision in Edgewood I, the Texas Supreme Court
instructed the Texas Legislature to take immediate action in developing a
system of funding that would comply with Article VII, Section 1. a  In
Edgewood I1, the Texas Supreme Court found Senate Bill 1, the State's
first attempt to establish a funding system in compliance with the effi-
ciency standards set in Edgewood I, to be unconstitutional.239 The court
stated that while the proposed legislation provided for a guaranteed reve-
nue per student, in general it failed to address the cause of the disparity in
funding which was a heavy reliance on a district's local tax base to pro-
vide educational revenue.240 The court also rejected the argument made
by plaintiff-intervenors that local taxes belonged to the state and were
subject to recapture for the purpose of equalizing funding.241 Instead, the
court held that Article VII, Section 3 prohibits such an interpretation and
clearly authorizes the levy of taxes by a school district for the sole pur-
pose of supporting schools within its boundaries.242
234. See id. at 393 (detailing the services wealthier districts were able to provide as the
result of their ability to generate greater local revenue).
235. See Edgewood 1, 777 S.W.2d at 393 (reiterating that disparities among school
districts rich in property value and those poor in property value are significant).
236. See id. at 397 (indicating that an increase in state revenue is not enough to equal-
ize the state's system of funding education).
237. See id. at 399 (modifying the trial court's decision and ordering the State to take
immediate action).
238. Senate Bill 1 relied on the existing system of state and local funding, however, in
an effort to comply with the Texas Supreme Court's holding in Edgewood 11, it called for
bi-annual studies to be conducted. See Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby, 804 S.W.2d
491, 494-95 (Tex. 1991) [Edgewood 11]. The results of these studies would in turn be used
by the Senate to determine the amount of state funds a school district was entitled to
receive. See id at 495.
239. See id. at 500 (holding that under Senate Bill 1, the state's system of funding
education remained unconstitutional).
240. See id. at 496 (explaining that Senate Bill 1 failed because it failed to draw reve-
nue from all property at a similar rate).
241. Plaintiff-intervenors argued that because school districts were created by the leg-
islature they were in essences creatures of the state. The revenue generated from local
taxes belongs to the state and can be subject to recapture by the state. See id at 499.
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In Edgewood III, the court rejected Senate Bill 351,243 the State's sec-
ond attempt to create a constitutional system of funding education. 244 In
doing so, the court held that the State could not mandate the amount a
school district would contribute from local taxes to the funding of educa-
tion.245 Senate Bill 351 called for the establishment of county education
districts, or CEDs.2 46 Each CED was made up of existing school districts
and was solely responsible for the levying of taxes at a rate set by stat-
ute.347 The CED would then collect and disburse the revenue generated
by the taxes equally to all the districts within its boundaries.2 48 The court
found that such a system violated Article VII, Section 3 of the Texas Con-
stitution which requires the approval of local taxpayers by vote before the
levying of any tax by a district can take place.2 49
In Edgewood IV, the State's effort to establish a constitutional system
of funding education was finally successful." 0 The court found that Sen-
ate Bill 7, 1 although it did not provide for complete equality, was a sig-
nificant improvement in closing the disparities between wealthy and poor
districts251 The court stated that an efficient system did not have to en-
sure equal funds at all levels of spending. A school district could use
243. The funding system proposed by Senate Bill 351 consisted of two tiers. The first
tier guaranteed an allotment of funds to each school district sufficient to provide a basic
education program. See Carroilton-Farmers Branch Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Edgewood Indep.
Sch. Dist., 826 S.W.2d 489, 498 (Tex. 1992) [Edgeivood III] (detailing the provisions of
Senate Bill 351). The two-tiered system was an attempt to provide equal access to enrich-
ment funds which guaranteed a specified amount of money for every cent of tax effort
above the assigned tax rate. See i (discussing how Senate Bill 351 operated).
244. See id. at 493 (holding that Senate Bill 351 levies a state ad valorem tax prior to
obtaining taxpayer consent through an election, an act that is prohibited by Article VII,
Section 3 of the Texas Constitution).
245. See id. at 498 (commenting that a provision contained wvithin Senate Bill 351
mandated that a County Education District tax a specifically assigned tax rate).
246. County Education Districts embraced existing school districts within the county's
boundary. See id. at 498 (outlining the responsibilities of CEDs).
247. See id. (explaining that the CEDs sole responsibility was to levy taxes and dis-
tribute revenue to school districts).
248. See id.
249. See Edgewood 111, 826 S.W.2d at 506 (construing Article VII, Section 3 to require
the approval of the electorate before a local ad valorem tax can be levied).
250. See Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Meno, 917 S.W.2d 717, 750 (Tex. 1995)
[Edgewood IV] (concluding that Senate Bill 7 is constitutional).
251. Senate Bill 7 provides a two-tiered system. Tier one guarantees a basic allotment
sufficient for school districts to provide a basic program of education. See id. at 727. To
qualify for tier one funding, however, a school district must tax at a minimum rate of 86
cents per $100 valuation. See id. Tier two of Senate Bill 7 is intended to provide equal
access to enrichment funds and guarantees $20.55 per student for every cent above the
required 86 cents minimum. See id- at 727-28.
252. See id. at 730-31 (stating that Senate Bill 7 meets it constitutional duty through
the guaranteed yield in tier two).
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excess funds raised from local revenue to provide enrichment pro-
grams . 5 3 The court held that an efficient system only has to provide
equal access to funds sufficient for the general diffusion of knowledge.
5 4
Because the plaintiffs were unable to demonstrate that remaining dispari-
ties continued to prohibit their ability to offer an adequate education,
Senate Bill 7 was found constitutional.5 5 The Supreme Court noted,
however, that should future circumstances change and the disparities in
fact become so pronounced that available funds were no longer sufficient
for the general diffusion of knowledge, the issue of constitutionality could
again be addressed?5 6
C. Possible Disparities Created by Vouchers
In determining whether vouchers will meet the efficiency standards set
by the Texas Supreme Court, it is important to first understand the possi-
ble disparities that a voucher system can create. It is equally important to
recognize that empirical data as to the actual financial effect vouchers will
have on particular school districts is very limited in light of the fact that a
state funded program has yet to be enacted.
A voucher system takes existing funds away from school districts in
order to subsidize the cost of a child's attendance at a private school.
257
The most recent voucher proposals by the Texas Legislature have made
participation in a program dependent upon such factors as a student's
family income or a student's attendance at a low performing campus.2-8
253. See id. at 729-30 (clarifying that an efficient system can permit unequalized local
supplementation); James M. Scott et. al., Developments in State Constitutional Law: 1995,
27 RUTGERS L. 963, 1035-38 (1996) (examining the Texas Supreme Court's ruling in
Edgewood v. Meno stating that funding does not have to be equal at all levels of spending
in order for an education system to be found constitutional).
254. See Edgewood IV, 917 S.W.2d at 731 (noting that under Senate Bill 7, "general
diffusion" is equated with state accreditation).
255. Plaintiffs argued that the lack of a "separate" facilities component fails to ensure
an efficient system of education. See id. at 746.
256. See id. at 732 (cautioning excessive state supplementation could become so great
that the system may become inefficient).
257. In Texas, proposed school voucher programs are referred to as "state scholar-
ships." See Tex. H.B. 709, 76th Leg., R.S. (1999) (detailing a voucher proposal offered by
State Representative Krusee which if enacted will provide state and local educational
funds to qualifying public school children wishing to attend private school); Homer, supra
note 113 (outlining State Representative Grusendorf's latest voucher proposal).
258. See Tex S.B. 10, 76th Leg., R.S. (1999) (limiting participation to educationally
disadvantaged students attending schools in Texas counties with a population of 575,000 or
more); Tex H.B. 709,76th Leg., R.S. (1999) (limiting participation to students who failed to
do well on the most recent academic assessment test, is educationally disadvantaged, at-
tends a school that has at least 60,000 students and lies within the boundaries of a metro-
politan city of at least one million); Tex. S.B. 1206, 75th Leg., R.S. (1997) (limiting
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Such restrictions are significant because the area in which vouchers are
anticipated to have the most impact is in regards to educational funding.
What this means, according to figures published by the Texas Education
Agencyas 9 is that the students most affected will be minorities. 260
As discussed earlier in this Comment, most voucher programs pro-
posed by members of the Texas State Legislature require that eighty per-
cent of a student's allotted state and local aide follow the qualifying child
to the private school of her choice.26' The remaining 20% would be re-
tained by the public school district the child is leaving, in hope that it will
be sufficient to cover fixed expenditures that would not be reduced by the
loss of students. 2 The actual monetary value of that 20%, however, will
vary depending on how the voucher program is funded. If the program is
funded using only state aid, then the amount of funds a district retains
becomes less in actual monetary value.263 As a result, a school district
which loses state funds will have no alternative but to rely on revenue
generated by local property taxes in order to compensate. A district such
as Edgewood, whose tax base is low, by its very nature will generate less
local revenue.264 In addition, Edgewood would lose the federal funding it
would have received for each child that remained in the public school
district.
If the loss of funds prevented a school district from meeting its fixed
expenditures, then to generate additional funding, the district would be
participation to students attending a low-performing public school who have sought to
transfer to another district and were denied); Tex. HJ3. 2395, 75th Leg., R.S. (1997) (limit-
ing participation to students who are from low income families).
259. See TEXAS EDUCATnON AGmEcy, supra note 115 (providing statistical data for
each school district in Texas).
260. See id. (providing the names of low-performing campuses). Three of the six ma-
jor urban schools districts in Texas (Dallas, Houston, and San Antonio) had low-perform-
ing campuses. See id. Anglo students make up eleven percent or less at each of the three
districts. See id. at 68, 116, 170.
261. See discussion infra Part IILC.3 (detailing the funding for proposed voucher
programs).
262. Fixed costs refers to operational and instructional expenditures such as teacher
salaries or building maintenance. See TEXAs EDuCATION AGENCY supra, note 115, at 356.
263. The following calculations are based upon figures published by the Texas Educa-
tion Agency. In 1996-97, Edgewood received $4589 in state funding per pupil. See id.
Eighty percent of $4589 equals approximately $3671. $3671 would be amount of state
funds per student lost by Edgewood to vouchers. Edgewood would retain approximately
$917 which is twenty-percent. See id. If a voucher system is funded using state and local
revenue, Edgewood would retain twenty-percent of $5500.86 which is approximately
$1100.18, almost $200 more per student. See id. Edgewood receives $5,852 in total aid per
student, of which state funds makeup 83%, local funds 11% and federal aid 6%. See id.
264. See Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391, 392 (Tex. 1989)
[Edgewood 1] (finding that disparities exist as the result of a district's inability to generate
local revenue due to low-property value).
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forced to increase taxes. The need to levy a tax could pose a problem,
because it is quite possible that vouchers would cut into a school district's
political base and directly affect its ability to raise revenue.26 Article
VII, Section 3 of the Texas Constitution requires schools to obtain the
consent of taxpayers before it can levy or increase taxes.266 If taxpayers
no longer have a vested interest in public schools because their child has
accepted a voucher, than it is logicalfy possible they would vote against
increasing property taxes. A loss of the election could be devastating be-
cause a district would be prohibited from adopting a tax rate for the cur-
rent year that exceeds the school district's rollback tax rate.267 Even if it
were assumed that voters would approve a tax increase, the rate at which
a district would have to tax in order to recoup the portion of funds likely
to be lost would be significant.
If a district decided not to raise additional funds or failed to pass an
initiative to raise additional funds, it would be forced to make cuts in
either its instructional or operational expenditures in order meet its fi-
nancial obligations. These cuts would directly impact the educational op-
portunities offered to their students. A cut in instructional expenses
would mean that a district might not be able to retain or hire qualified
teachers, or would have to postpone the purchase of new books, com-
puters, or science equipment. A cut in operational expenses could mean
that new facilities would not be built or that needed repairs would not be
completed.
265. See Helen Hershkoff & Adam S. Cohen, School Choice and the Lessons of Choc-
taw County, 10 YALE L. POL'y REv. 1, 9 (1992) (describing the political and financial
impact vouchers had on Choctaw County, Alabama as citizens were torn between which
system of education to support, private or public). The County of Choctaw's experience
with vouchers came as the result of attempts by white citizens to continue segregation in
education. See id. at 5-6; see also Interview with Jose Cortez, supra note 113 (explaining
how vouchers could affect a district's political support and thus its ability to generate
revenue).
266. See TE.. CONST. art. VII, § 3 (requiring voter consent prior to the levying of any
tax).
267. See Tax. TAX CODE ANN. § 26.08 (d)(i)(1) (Vernon Supp. 1999) (outlining the
election procedure for ratifying school taxes). The effect of applying a rollback tax rate is
that a school district can generate funds from local taxes at a rate no higher than the
previous year. See id.; see also Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Meno, 917 S.W.2d 717, 733
(Tex. 1995) [Edgewood IV] (focusing on the plaintiffs argument that rollback elections
place property poor school districts at a disadvantage); Interview with Jose Cortez, supra
note 113 (discussing the impact a loss of a rollback election would have on a school district
attempting to recover from the loss of state funds).
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D. Applying the "Efficiency Standard" to Vouchers
Evaluating these possible disparities in light of the Texas Supreme
Court's ruling in Edgewood I, it is clear that a voucher program fails to
meet the efficiency standards set forth by the court and would therefore
violate Article VII, Section 1 of the Texas Constitution. First, a voucher
system fails to use all available resources to produce results with little
waste. Second, it fails to provide equal access to educational funds. And
third, it fails to provide for the general diffusion of knowledge.
In determining whether or not a voucher system uses all available re-
sources to produce results with little waste, it is necessary to look at the
Texas Supreme Court ruling in Love v. City of Dallas.'l In Love, the
Texas Supreme Court held that the State could not compel a school dis-
trict to pay for the education of a student residing outside of its district
without providing just compensation.269 In reaching its finding, the court
concluded that a school district took the position of trustee, and was re-
sponsible for holding school funds in trust for the benefit of the children
within its boundaries.270 The State cannot, therefore, compel the diver-
sion of school funds for any other purpose without obtaining the consent
of the taxpayers 7 1
If a voucher system were implemented using local funds in addition to
state funds, the legislature, in accordance with Texas Supreme Court's
ruling in Love, would be required to gain the approval of the district tax-
payers before the local funds could be diverted to private schools. If the
taxpayers denied the transfer of funds the State would be left to subsidize
the entire cost of a private education. Currently, the State and the local
districts share in the cost of educating the children of Texas. But under a
State funded voucher program, the State would be assuming a local bur-
den. In this respect, the Legislature would not be using all available re-
sources, in ensuring an efficient system of education. Local revenue for
each voucher student would be left untapped. In addition, local school
districts would also lose local funding as it would unable to justify raising
additional revenue for students no longer present in their schools. A
voucher system would also prevent a school district from obtaining any
federal funding it may have received for that lost student which would
mean another resource left untapped. 272
268. 40 S.W.2d 20 (Tex. 1931).
269. See id. at 27 (stating that the legislature cannot compel a district to accept a
transfer student without compensation).
270. See id. (holding that property is held in trust for the school district by the city and
cannot be diverted for any other purpose).
271. See id (finding that not even the state legislature can divert funds).
272. In an effort to avoid legal challenges under the Federal Constitution Establish-
ment Clause, state legislators have not proposed using federal funds in implementing a
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A voucher system is also inefficient because it fails to provide substan-
tial equal access to education funds for all students. Upon losing state,
local, and federal funds a district would have no alternative but to in-
crease taxes if the loss of revenue prevented it from maintaining its cur-
rent standard of education. The district at that point would be solely
dependent upon local revenue to meet state requirements. Forcing a lo-
cal district to rely on revenue generated from property tax in order to
maintain a minimum level of education, was found to be unconstitutional
by the Texas Supreme Court.273 A voucher system would be unconstitu-
tional "not because any unequalized local supplementation is employed,"
but because the State, just as the Court found in Edgewood I, would be
relying on unequalized local funds in an attempt to meet its constitutional
duty to provide for an efficient system of public free schools. 74
Under the current State system of funding education, a school district
low in property value has $830 less per student to spend than a district
high in property value.275 In order for the gap to be completely closed,
the State would have to infuse a larger amount of money into tier two of
the funding system.276 If a voucher system is implemented, the State is
not infusing money to close the gap but is instead removing funds from
schools districts and diverting them to private schools. The gap will
therefore get larger, not smaller in size.
Lastly, a voucher system is not efficient because it fails to provide for
the general diffusion of knowledge. A school district, which must tax at a
higher rate to meet minimum State standards, will not able to provide the
same educational experience for its students as those found in a wealthier
district. A wealthier district, unaffected by vouchers, would be able to
voucher program. See Interview with Jose Cortez, supra note 113 (explaining that any pri-
vate school accepting federal funds would be required to follow federal guidelines and
procedures).
273. See Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby, 804 S.W.2d 491, 496 (Tex. 1991)
[Edgewood I1] (stating that a funding system which is dependent on local property tax
must draw revenue from all property at a similar rate); Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v.
Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391, 392 (Tex. 1989) [Edgewood 1] (considering that property poor dis-
trict used a greater portion of their local funds in order to meet minimum state accredita-
tion standards in determining that the State's system of funding education was
unconstitutional).
274. See Edgewood I, 804 S.W.2d at 500.
275. See Telephone Interview with Craig Foster, Executive Director, Equity Center
(Nov. 1998) (discussing the existing disparities between poor and rich districts).
276. The State's system of funding education consist of two tiers. The first tier is a
guaranteed allotment of approximately $2,300 per student. To qualify for this fund, a
school district must tax at a minimum of 86 cents per $1 valuation. Tier two of the funding
system is a guaranteed fund of $20.55 per student for every cent a school district taxes
above 86 cents. The purpose of tier two is to provide equal access to enrichment funds.
See TEXAS EDUCATION AGENcy, supra note 115, at 22.
[Vol. 1:323
44
The Scholar: St. Mary's Law Review on Race and Social Justice, Vol. 1 [2018], No. 1, Art. 7
https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thescholar/vol1/iss1/7
THE UNTOLD TRUTH
provide enrichment programs, a better curriculum, better personnel, bet-
ter technology and better facilities. Just as in Edgewood I, the quality of
education would be dramatically impacted by the ability of a school dis-
trict to raise local funds.277
Failing to meet the efficiency standard set forth in Edgewood I, a
voucher system, if implemented as proposed by the current State Legisla-
ture would violate, Article VII, Section 1 of the Texas Constitution.
VI. CONCLUSION
As proposed, a voucher system in Texas would target either low-per-
forming districts or students of low-income. Regardless of which method
of distribution is ultimately chosen, the fact remains that the majority of
students affected will be minorities. It is true that a few students will
benefit; but at what cost to the others? Vouchers do nothing to provide a
district with the funds needed to improve the education it offers and in-
stead, diverts funds to private institutions. If it is true that the Texas Con-
stitution "derives its force from the people" as the Texas Supreme Court
has said,27 8 then minority and low-income school children have the right
to be heard.
The implementation of a voucher system is not an implied right under
the Texas Constitution and must be viewed as merely an alternative
method of funding education. As such, in order to pass constitutional
muster, a voucher system is required to meet the efficiency standard set
forth by the Texas Supreme Court in Edgewood v. Kirby." 9
In Edgewood I, the Texas Supreme Court held that an efficient system
of funding education was one that used all available resources with little
waste, offered equal access to educational funds, and provided for the
general diffusion of knowledge.'80 As this Comment has shown, a
voucher system in Texas would fail to meet such a standard.
A voucher system fails to make use of all available resources, as the
sole use of State funds to subsidize the cost of tuition at a private school
would leave the resource of local revenue untapped. A school district
attempting to compensate for the loss of state funds would be unable to
justify raising local revenue for students no longdr present in the district.
The state would be left carrying a burden intended by the framers to be
shared with local districts. A voucher system also fails to offer equal ac-
277. See Edgeiwood I, 777 S.W.2d at 393 (emphasizing that a school district's ability to
raise revenue has a real impact on the education it offers).
278. See id. at 394.
279. See id. at 397 (holding that a constitutional system of funding must be financially
efficient and must provide for the general diffusion of knowledge).
280. See id. (defining "financially efficient").
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cess to educational funds. A school district that is losing state and local
money as a result of vouchers would be forced to rely more heavily on
revenue generated by local property taxes. The use of these funds would
go to maintain minimum state educational standards rather than to pro-
vide enhancement programs such as those found in wealthier districts. In
other words, a school district would be required to tax high, but spend
low. In Edgewood I, such a requirement was found to be in violation of
Article VII, Section 1." I
Lastly, a voucher system fails to provide for the general diffusion of
knowledge. Students attending schools in districts forced to use local rev-
enue to maintain state standards, would be denied educational opportuni-
ties afforded to children in wealthier districts. A district unaffected by
vouchers would use local revenue to hire more qualified faculty, to
purchase more advanced technology, or to offer a broader curriculum
with enrichment classes. Students in poorer districts would be denied
such experiences. The disparities in funding created by vouchers, there-
fore, would have a dramatic impact on the quality of education a district
is able to offer. In Edgewood 1, such disparities were found to be a viola-
tion of Article VII, Section 1. Having failed to meet the "efficiency" stan-
dard set forth by the Texas Supreme Court, a voucher system if imposed
would violate article VII, Section 1 of the Texas Constitution and would
therefore be unconstitutional.
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